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Introduction
Last December the Chief Financial Officer of the leading 
Chinese telecommunication company Huawei was travel-
ling from Hong Kong to Mexico when she was arrested while 
changing flights at Vancouver Airport by the Canadian author-
ities acting on an extradition request from the United States. 
Meng’s arrest and detention are a significant development in 
China-US relations, marking a dramatic change in the relation-
ship between Beijing and Washington.
The current trade war between the US and China looks like a 
small element in a much larger contest over world leadership in 
which China plays the part of the ascending challenger that seeks 
to upset the existing balance of power. China’s weapons of choice 
are technology and innovation: it is making a frontal assault on 
the US in a sector that has traditionally been America’s forte.
Imperial China was recognised as an inventor of advanced 
technology, and its best-known inventions (the magnetic com-
pass, gunpowder) were essential factors in the country’s rising 
influence, giving it a significant advantage over other region-
al powers. Despite this technological background, however, 
Communist China has so far primarily opted for a different 
path: its preferred approach has been to acquire Western tech-
nology as a way of boosting its own innovation and growth. The 
means China employs to this end have often been denounced 
as barely legal: the rules imposed on access to the Chinese mar-
ket, for instance, forced American multinationals to set up 
joint ventures with Chinese enterprises, which then demanded 
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technology transfers as a part of the deal. Although those rules 
are set to become less stringent in January 2020, they were in 
place for decades and China will undoubtedly continue to feel 
the benefit. The “Thousand Talents Plan” unveiled in 2008 was 
another blatant example of the same strategy: targeting Chinese 
academics outside the country, it offered them state subsidies 
and tenured positions in China’s top universities if they would 
set up research programmes in China on the basis of the scien-
tific knowledge they had acquired in their work abroad.
Acquisitions of technology became more prominent as 
China turned out to be the second biggest global economy. 
Chinese investments in the West have targeted high-tech com-
panies: in 2016, Chinese foreign investments in the technolo-
gy sector reached US$24.13 billion, and included the acquisi-
tion of Kuka Robotics, a German pioneer of Industry 4.0, by 
Guangdong Midea Consumer Electric. Such investments are 
perfectly in line with Premier Li Keqiang’s plan entitled “Made 
in China 2025”, which subsidises mergers and acquisitions of 
Western companies with the objective of strengthening China’s 
chains of production.
Whatever the preferred strategy, Beijing’s efforts are pay-
ing off. China’s top telecommunication providers Huawei and 
ZTE, for instance, were the first to develop the technology 
needed for the commercial application of 5G. 
Against this backdrop, the US is keen to point out that 
China has been unfair in its path towards technological lead-
ership while not moving towards democracy – as expected – 
even after forty years of engagement with Western powers. Yet 
despite President Trump’s tariffs, the extensive linkage between 
China and the US has created such highly intertwined strategic 
and economic benefits for both countries that disastrous results 
would inevitably ensue for each of them if they were forced 
apart.
China is not only acquiring technology; it now also has ambi-
tions concerning the regulation of international trade and glob-
al governance generally. In other words, China is challenging 
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the liberal order out of which it emerged as a global player. 
Just what a China-led global order would look like is still un-
clear, and the uncertainties are even more significant since the 
technology sector has rules of its own. The inherent dangers 
of technology need to be meticulously assessed, as they have 
the potential to alter the core values of modern societies, with 
which they are inextricably entwined.
This need is becoming more pressing as China’s technologi-
cal rise is no longer a thing of the future, but a present reality: 
there are other pointers to it besides leadership in the commer-
cial application of 5G technology. The biggest of all start-ups, 
for instance, is the financial arm of Alibaba (Ant Financial), 
with an estimated value of over US$150 billion; and of the 
top fifty unicorn companies (start-ups valued at US$1 billion 
or more), 26 are Chinese and 16 American. Europe does not 
make the list at all. In terms of growth, moreover, while top 
US tech companies grew 26% between 2017 and 2018, their 
Chinese counterparts grew at 33%. This gap between East and 
West is growing wider and wider, and it would be unwise to 
ignore it. Most recently, Google has taken action to fill this gap 
by precluding Huawei’s access to Android, the system on which 
most Huawei smartphones operate. Google acted upon a ban 
from the US government that demands American telecommu-
nication companies not to install foreign equipment that may 
threaten national security. Less than a day later, the US granted 
a temporary general licence to the Chinese telecom provider, 
so as to reduce the damage that an abrupt halt would inflict to 
US companies and organisations that run their operations on 
Huawei’s products and to limit repercussions from China.
Last year’s ISPI report was entitled “China, Champion of 
(Which) Globalisation?”. It focused on the kind of globalisation 
that China’s growing influence would bring to the world, exam-
ining the changes, rules and standards implied by a China-led 
economic system. This year it is time to investigate what part 
technology will play in China’s rise.
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The present ISPI report tackles the question by looking at 
various practical aspects of China’s challenge to US technolog-
ical leadership and by considering its implications for the US, 
Europe and – last but not least – the entire global liberal order. 
While the trade war is a weapon in a wider technological con-
test, the two powers’ race for world leadership in technology is 
a battle between two different approaches to economic growth. 
In China the Communist Party remains the main provider of 
innovation: it sets the standards for businesses to follow, and 
the objectives. In the West, on the other hand, governments 
have a more peripheral role since they are only in charge of pro-
viding public goods; businesses are free to follow the direction 
indicated by markets. China’s state-oriented economic model is 
rooted in a practical protectionism that challenges the Western 
principle of free trade and the multilateral global economy 
championed by the World Trade Organization.
In her first chapter, Alessia Amighini attempts to answer the 
baseline question of whether China has what it takes to strip 
the US of the title of global technology leader. Amighini stress-
es that despite the long series of investments towards innova-
tion enacted by the Chinese leadership since the 1970s, the 
country has not yet found a way to advance disruptive tech-
nologies to the same extent of incremental technologies. This 
inability is a substantial loss, as it is disruptive technologies that 
have the potential to reform the global economy, thus offering a 
considerable advantage to their proponents. The challenges that 
Amighini identifies as the sources of China’s struggle over tech-
nology advancements mainly point to three domains of China’s 
economic system: institutional, organisational and social barri-
ers. The reform of these domain is, according to Amighini, key 
for the country to assume full control of the global technology 
sector.
Jie Yu’s chapter analyses the implications of China’s glob-
al technological leadership in terms of a reshaping of global 
alliances. Specifically, Yu focuses on the implications for the 
European Union, whose internal crises are making it unable to 
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perform its traditional role as mediator between China and the 
US. In addition, President Xi Jinping might well grow increas-
ingly confrontational as China’s economy loses momentum: 
according to IMF data, GDP growth fell from 6.9% in 2017 to 
6.6% in 2018, and the IMF forecasts a further slowing to 6.2% 
in 2019. Yu points out that President Xi Jinping has promised 
both a stronger party and a freer market. Technological progress 
will be the key to China’s success. 
The precise degree of interconnection between China and the 
US is the subject of the chapter by James A. Lewis, who argues 
that a disengagement of the two economic superpowers would 
lead to a series of shocks that are bound to have a severe impact 
on advanced economies and on major emerging markets such 
as India. According to Lewis, the more nationalistic the stance 
taken by the US the greater the distinctive advantage to China. 
The danger is that this opposition between China and the US 
could become an all-out “technological Cold War”, with effects 
on the global economy which cannot yet be predicted.
Given the practical applications of the topic, this ISPI report 
focuses on two sectors mostly affected by China’s technological 
rise: energy and fintech (financial technology). On the ener-
gy sector, Fabio Indeo presents the geopolitical implications of 
China’s leadership in terms of sustainable energy. Beijing’s in-
creased reliance on renewable sources is building a reputation 
for China among its trading partners as a reliable energy super-
power, for China supports the development of its partners’ own 
energy production capacity, also by reducing their dependence 
on oil and gas. The energy sector is not unaffected by the pres-
ent US-China confrontation, as President Trump’s 30% tariff 
on imports of solar cells and panels is intended to protect US 
manufacturing.
Another study focuses on fintech, or the retail distribution 
of financial goods and services using information and com-
munication technology (ICT) such as online banking, smart-
phone applications and cryptocurrencies. Although fintech 
platforms significantly reduce costs, they have a drawback in 
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the inaccurate measurement of risk, and that in turn endangers 
the stability of the financial system. Paolo Giudici presents a 
comparative study of fintech platforms in China and Italy, and 
concludes that more accurate assessment of credit risk by P2P 
platforms would be a viable solution and would make fintech 
more sustainable.
As the US-China trade war reaches new levels of complex-
ity, speculation abounds. The global liberal order has already 
been weakened by repeated systemic shocks. Losing the race 
for world leadership in technology could be the final nail in the 
coffin for US hegemony, and an ideal opportunity for China to 
take the lead. It is for this reason that the unfolding of the US-
China confrontation shows that President Trump is conscious 
of the extent of the trade war – that is, a global technological 
leadership that, in the not too distant future, is bound to trans-
form into an all-out battle for global leadership tout court.
Paolo Magri
ISPI Executive Vice President and Director
1.  Beijing: Ready for Global 
     Technology Leadership?
Alessia Amighini
The rapid growth of China’s economy over the last 40 years 
has relied upon very high rates of physical capital accumula-
tion on a scale that is unique and unprecedented in economic 
history. This pattern of economic growth has been more suc-
cessful in expanding production capacities than in “building 
a widespread and robust indigenous innovation capability in 
Chinese firms”1. Very rapid accumulation of production capi-
tal allowed China to grow as the world’s factory, but at a very 
high cost of depletion of natural capital, which now requires a 
lot of resources to clean up and therefore poses a limit to further 
growth.
However, the more challenging limitations to the possibility 
of China’s having the potential for sustainable growth in the 
future are more likely to depend on its ability to accumulate a 
further type of capital, i.e. intellectual capital, the kind of cap-
ital that is fundamental for economic growth in mature econ-
omies, as it is the most important factor that fosters science, 
technology, and innovation. New growth theories and new 
trade theories emphasise a strong link between an increase in 
the knowledge base and the rate of productivity growth, and 
1 S. Gu and B.Lundvall, “China’s Innovation System and The Move Towards 
Harmonious Growth and Endogenous Innovation”, in B.-Å. Lundvall (ed.), 
The Learning Economy and the Economics of  Hope, Anthem Studies in Innovation and 
Development, Anthem Press, 2016, pp. 281-282.
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therefore knowledge and learning play a pivotal role in eco-
nomic development2.
The need to shift to a growth path that relies more on inno-
vation to achieve sustainable economic growth has been very 
high on the agenda of Chinese authorities since 1978, when 
the first National Science Conference was organised where 
Deng Xiaoping acknowledged that science and technology are 
a productive force, the key to China’s “Four Modernisations” 
drive, and that intellectuals are part of the working class3. The 
policy attention and space given to innovation have progres-
sively increased over time, so that now China’s innovation pol-
icies have evolved into something much more ambitious, to 
the point that they are now considered a challenge to the rest 
of the world. China has outperformed its growth record with 
an exceptionally high rate of investment in knowledge since 
2000, with investment in R&D, the annual number of PhD 
graduates and the number of scientific publications all growing 
at double the rate of GDP growth per year (20%).
This chapter will venture into the issue of China’s position 
in the global technology landscape, by asking the somewhat 
naive question of how likely it is for China to become a global 
technology leader. Of course, China has developed a wide range 
of specific technical capabilities to innovate in a number of sec-
tors, sometimes leapfrogging industrialised economies (as in the 
well-known case of electric cars). However, the huge economic 
literature on the history and mechanics of technological inno-
vation suggests that global technology leadership entails a lot 
more than the individual ability to innovate in some sectors. 
Indeed, it requires a series of changes within the domestic 
environment that go far beyond the scientific and techno-
logical skills, and also include institutional, organisational 
2 B.-Å. Lundvall, “The Economics of  Knowledge and Learning”, in J.L. 
Christensen and B.-Å. Lundvall (eds.) Product Inovation, Interactive Learning and 
Economic Performance (Research on Technological Innovation, Management and Policy, 
Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2004, pp. 21-42. 
3 OECD, OECD Reviews of  Innovation Policy, “China”, 2008, OECD, Paris.
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and social changes. This is the perspective I will follow when 
asking what the likelihood is of China managing to upgrade 
from its latecomer and follower position to a more prominent 
role on the global scene; what internal constraints China faces 
that might jeopardise its plans, and which direction the country 
should take to become a credible contender for the global tech-
nology leadership role.
Innovation is among the least tangible of the growth fac-
tors.  In most of economic history, societies that have reached 
the highest degree of technological innovation and economic 
growth are countries with a more individualistic culture4, that 
rewards personal achievements with social status and monetary 
incentives, while countries with a more collectivist culture have 
invariably enjoyed lower long-run growth5. Asian industrialised 
economies (Japan, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea) are a 
notable exception to that pattern, as they have consistently out-
performed (in terms of growth, patenting activity and innova-
tion) countries with higher levels of individualism (measured 
by Hofstede’s index of individualism)6.   
China today also poses a theoretical and empirical challenge 
to the extant knowledge on the role of culture and institutions 
in growth, to the extent that it requires a better understanding 
of which factors underpin the relation between innovation and 
growth in societies with low levels of individualism. China is 
today at the forefront of a global transformation of the geog-
raphy of world innovation and aims at establishing itself as 
a major hub for both the generation of knowledge and the 
production of innovation7. However, according to Lundvall, 
4 Y. Gorodnichenko and G. Roland, “Culture, Institutions, and the Wealth of  
Nations”, The Review of  Economics and Statistics, vol. 99, no. 3, July 2017, pp. 
402-416.
5 Y. Gorodnichenko and G. Roland, “Individualism, innovation, and long-run 
growth”, PNAS, 27 December 2011, vol. 108 (Supplement 4).
6 Ibid.
7 A. Rodríguez-Pose and C. Wilkie, “Putting China in perspective: a comparative 
exploration of  the ascent of  the Chinese knowledge economy”, Cambridge Journal 
of  Regions, Economy and Society, no. 2016, pp. 479-497.
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in China “this massive investment in knowledge has not 
[yet] been accompanied by a corresponding effort to build a 
learning economy”8. A learning economy is one where work-
ers, consumers and citizens interact together in many complex 
ways and participate in the economy and society, one “where 
the success of individuals, firms, regions and countries will re-
flect, more than anything else, their ability to learn”9. According 
to the wide body of research that investigated the nature and 
the mechanics of innovation10, the enhancement of innovation 
from imported or marginal innovation to endogenous innova-
tion requires building a learning economy, the basis of which 
is social capital, the highest, less tangible and less reproducible 
form of capital in a society. Although there is growing attention 
to the evolution of social capital in contemporary China, there 
is still very scant research on how it affects innovation activities.
It goes far beyond the scope of this chapter to either review 
or summarise the results of the extant research on the evolu-
tion, features and impact of China’s national innovation sys-
tem. What we will do in Section 1 is to start from the main 
highlights and takeaways from the growing body of economic 
literature that explores innovation in China from a range of 
perspectives11 to understand the position of China in the in-
ternational knowledge landscape and the major challenges that 
China is facing today to succeed in becoming a learning econ-
omy. The section will draw on the growing body of evidence 
on the innovation performance of Chinese firms to highlight 
some of the institutional and organisational factors China is 
currently facing as major obstacles to further improvement in 
its innovative capacities.
8, p. 382. B.-Å. Lundvall (2016), p. 382.
9 B.-Å. Lundvall, “Economics of  Knowledge to the Learning Economy”, in 
Knowledge management in the learning economy, Paris, OECD, 2000.
10 See among others B.-Å. Lundvall (ed.), National Systems of  Innovation: Towards a 
Theory of  Innovation and Interactive Learning, London, Pinter, 1992.
11 A. Rodríguez-Pose and C. Wilkie (2016).
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Knowledge, Technology and Innovation: 
Where Does China Stand?
China is a latecomer country in the global technology land-
scape. Today some Chinese firms are developing their own 
innovative capabilities, they are introducing their own global 
brands, but most Chinese firms are far from being innovation 
leaders and the country is still overall dependent on the supply 
of foreign technology. However, China has been committed, 
since the Open-door policy (1978), to enhancing human cap-
ital formation and increasing capabilities in science, technolo-
gy and innovation by boosting investment in knowledge and 
R&D, and by building a more efficient innovation system. 
The history of China’s innovation policies is complex, dates 
back to the late 1970s, and has been a chief factor in its current 
innovation trajectory12. Innovation policies in China have be-
come even more prominent in recent years, following the need 
to implement new sources of growth. As Chinese labour costs 
have increased, firms are relocating their manufacturing activi-
ties to countries with lower labour costs, so China’s competitive 
advantage as a global manufacturer is eroding. A 30-year strat-
egy to strengthen China’s position in the global economy 
was launched in 2015 with a series of national ten-year plans 
to enhance innovation, product quality and environmental 
sustainability, optimising the industrial structure and devel-
oping human resources in Chinese manufacturing. The first 
of these plans has been called “Made in China 2025” and 
includes ten key sectors of intervention (ICT, robotics, agricul-
ture, aerospace, marine, railway equipment, clean energy, new 
materials, biological medicine and medical devices). In paral-
lel, the “Internet Plus” initiative was launched in 2015, with a 
view to digitalising major sectors of the economy and building 
12 See Liu Feng-chao, Denis Fred Simon, Sun Yu-tao, Cao Cong, China’s innovation 
policies: Evolution, institutional structure, and trajectory, Research Policy 40, 2011, pp. 
917-931; B.-Å. Lundvall (2016); OECD (2008); OECD, G20 Innovation Report 
2016, 2016, OECD, Paris; A. Rodriguez-Pose and C. Wilkie (2016).  
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a service-oriented, interconnected intelligent industrial ecosys-
tem by 202513. 
Today China is a rapidly emerging player in the Science, 
Technology and Innovation (STI) landscape. According to a 
number of selected innovation indicators collected and dis-
cussed in the G20 Innovation Report 2016, China has achieved 
a record performance in many dimensions14. Compared to 
the world’s largest R&D performer, the United States, China 
ranks second, and is broadly similar to the combined EU28 
area. China has a similar percentage of gross expenditure on 
R&D financed by industry (between 75 and 80%) as Japan and 
South Korea, all of them much higher than the OECD aver-
age of 60.9% (update). Unlike Japan and South Korea, where 
the overall gross expenditure on R&D is much higher than the 
OECD average of 2.4%, China spent around 2% of GDP on 
R&D. China has set a national R&D target of 2.5% of GDP, 
like many other OECD countries, and now ranks fifth in the 
international ranking after Japan, Germany, the United States 
and France, before the combined EU28. 
China has therefore gained significant ground in enabling 
itself to lead the Next Industrial Revolution, which refers to a 
range of technologies including the so-called Internet of Things 
(advance robotics, 3D printing) as well as big data analysis 
and quantum computing technologies, which are among the 
currently most disruptive technologies. Taken together, Japan, 
South Korea, and China have contributed about 36% of such 
inventions, compared to a declining share by both the United 
States and the EU.
Public support for business R&D in China has been pro-
vided by both direct public R&D support for business (such 
13 This paragraph mainly draws from “China Manufacturing 2025: Putting 
Industrial Policies Ahead of  Market Forces” European Union Chamber of  
Commerce in China, 2017.
14 These indicators are taken from the OECD Science, Technology and Industry 
Scoreboard 2015. The data reported in this Section are taken from a more recent 
release of  the same Scoreboard published in 2017.
Beijing: Ready for Global Technology Leadership? 19
as grants or contracts), and tax relief measures. In 2015, 28 
OECD countries gave preferential tax treatment to business 
R&D expenditures. Korea, the Russian Federation and France 
provided the most combined support for business R&D as a 
percentage of GDP in 2013, while the United States, France 
and China provided the largest volumes of tax support. The rel-
ative importance of tax incentives has increased across a major-
ity of OECD countries and G20 economies, but many hightly 
innovative countries do not provide R&D tax incentives, such 
as Germany and Mexico15.
Besides general policy attention and effort devoted to an 
overall increase in national R&D investment, a series of spe-
cific policies were introduced with the aim of fostering the cre-
ation of new knowledge and technologies through an increase 
in high-level competences. There are two different sets of in-
dicators one should examine when trying to assess the relative 
strength of a socio-economic system in terms of innovative ca-
pacities over time. One such set refers to the number and share 
of top-performing students among 15-year-olds, to the extent 
that the acquisition of high-level talents and skills starts at a 
very early age. According to data on proficiency patterns from 
the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment 
(PISA)16, there is high variability among the G20 economies 
in the proportion of top performers across countries, both in 
matematics and in science. In all G20 economies, the share of 
top performers was higher in mathematics than in science17, 
and the first two positions are for Shanghai and Hong Kong, 
followed by South Korea, Macao (China) and Japan.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
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Fig. 1.1 - Top performers in mathematics and science, selected 
G20 economies, 2012 
Notes: The OECD PISA programme assessed in 2012 the skills of 15-year‐olds 
in 65 economies. Around 510,000 students participated, representing 28 million 
15-year‐olds globally. “Students” assessed by PISA are between the ages of 15 
years 3 months and 16 years 2 months. They must be enrolled in school and 
have completed at least 6 years of formal schooling, regardless of the type of 
institution, the programme followed, or whether the education is full‐time or 
part‐time. “Top performers in science” are students proficient at Levels 5 and 
6 in the PISA 2012 science assessment (i.e. they have obtained scores higher 
than 633.3 points). “Top performers in mathematics” are students proficient at 
Levels 5 and 6 in the PISA 2012 mathematics assessment (i.e. with scores higher 
than 607.0). These students are expected to be at the forefront of a competitive, 
knowledge‐based global economy. They are able to draw on and use information 
from multiple and indirect sources to solve complex problems.
Source: OECD (2014), “PISA 2012 Results: What Students Know and Can 
Do – Student Performance” in Mathematics, Reading and Science, vol. I, Revised 
edition, February 2014, OECD Publishing, Paris.
A second set of indicators of a country’s capacity to sustain the 
human capital education that is required to enable innovation 
activities include the level of investment in science and engi-
neering. Data on the supply of graduates in the natural scienc-
es and engineering show that the proportion of those highly 
educated individuals is still low in China compared to other 
G20 countries. In particular, Germany and South Korea supply 
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the largest percentage of tertiary education graduates in nat-
ural sciences and engineering, while the proportion of grad-
uates in natural sciences and engineering among doctorates 
is higher than for other tertiary levels, reaching an average of 
approximately 40% for a sample of G20 economies. The nat-
ural sciences account for almost 50% of new doctoral degrees 
awarded in France. Engineering accounts for more than 50% of 
new doctoral degrees in South Korea and Japan18.
Although high-level competences and skills are required to in-
crease the potential supply of innovation in a society, one should 
not forget that the diffusion of innovation depends on both sup-
ply and demand factors. High demand for innovation in a socie-
ty depends on the diffusion of basic level skills that enables a large 
proportion of the population to develop the abilities to adopt 
and therefore to demand innovation (the so-called absortive ca-
pacity). The demand for innovation also depends on the overall 
perception of the impact of science and technology on people’s 
lives. A comparison of results from household surveys carried out 
in different countries indicates that the public in China has a 
mainly positive view of the societal impact of science and tech-
nology, with over 80% of respondents having a more positive 
view than the percentage in Germany, France and Italy19.
Besides innovation policy, a further chief channel through 
which China has pursued upgrading its innovation score is 
the set of policies that have favored inflows of knowledge 
into the country. Acknowledging that access to foreign knowl-
edge is one important vehicle for improving one’s own capabil-
ities not just to adopt but also to develop innovation, China 
has facilitated the acquisition of two types of knowledge, 
one embedded in people, the other embedded in goods. The 
former has been achieved by facilitating researcher mobility 
from abroad. Formally, since 2008, there has been a national 
policy aimed at benefitting from scientific knowledge produced 
18 Ibid.
19 OECD (2016).
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abroad by inviting talented scholars and researchers to take ten-
ured positions in China, the so-called “Thousand Talent Plan”. 
China reversed what were net outflows experienced in the late 
1990s into a significant net inflow of authors in the last few 
years and today has the world’s second largest (positive) per-
centage of net inflows of scientific authors, after the United 
States. This is a very important channel for the diffusion of sci-
entific knowledge, and shows that while some countries are net 
receivers, some others (e.g. major European economies) are net 
providers of scientific authors to the rest of the world20.
Fig 1.2 -  International net flows of scientific authors, 
G20 economies, 1999-2013 
Note: This figure decomposes the overall net flow of scientific authors across 
different years for G20 economies over the period 1999‐2013, expressed in rel-
ative terms. This helps to identify the timing and intensity of different phases of 
net entry and net exit from the perspective of a given country. For example, the 
United States and China experienced similar net inflows over the entire period 
(see the diamond) but the timing and trends are rather different. In the case of 
the United States, the net flows turn from being positive in the early 2000s to 
negative in more recent years, while for China the pattern is exactly the opposite. 
It is difficult to capture consistently the movement of scientists through statistical 
20 OECD (2015).
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surveys, which are national in scope. Monitoring changes in scientist affiliations 
in global repositories of publications provides a complementary source of de-
tailed information but these are limited to authors who publish, and moreover 
who publish regularly: otherwise their affiliations cannot be detected and timed 
in a sufficiently accurate way. Mobility can only be computed among authors 
with at least two publications. These indicators are likely to understate flows 
involving moves to industry or organisations within which scholarly publication 
is not the norm.
Source: OECD calculations based on Scopus Custom Data, Elsevier, version 
4.2015, http://oe.cd/scientometrics, June 2015.
Knowledge acquisition also happened through acquisition of 
stakes in foreign firms (so-called knowledge-seeking FDI)21. 
This is the case of strategic asset-seeking motives that inspire 
Chinese acquisitions in developed economies22. Chinese mul-
tinational enterprises (MNEs) use acquisitions as a vehicle to 
access advanced knowledge and to initiate a reverse-knowledge 
transfer to the Chinese parent company. Chinese investors are 
interested in both technological know-how and managerial 
knowledge such as brand or sales expertise. In this way, Chinese 
MNEs aim to overcome their competitive disadvantages and to 
catch up to their Western MNE competitor23. A study shows 
that outward FDI has a positive effect on the innovation per-
formance of Chinese emerging market enterprises’ subsidiaries 
(EMEs) and that this effect is stronger when the outward FDI 
is directed towards developed rather than emerging countries. 
These findings advance the notion that EMEs can use outward 
FDI as a strategy to globalise R&D and enhance their innova-
tion performance24.
21 See among others H. Berry, “Leaders, laggards, and the pursuit of  foreign 
knowledge”, Strategic Management Journal, vol. 27, no. 2, 2005, pp. 101-129.
22 N. Zheng, Y. Wei, Y. Zhang, and J. Yang, “In search of  strategic assets through 
cross- border merger and acquisitions: Evidence from Chinese multinational en-
terprises in developed economies”, International Business Review, vol. 25, no. 1, 
2016, pp. 177-186.
23 Ibid.
24 P. Piperopoulos, Jie Wu, Chengqi Wang, “Outward FDI, location choices and 
innovation performance of  emerging market enterprises”, Research Policy, vol. 47, 
no. 1, 2018, pp. 232-240.
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Last but not least, the type of knowledge acquired from 
abroad is embedded in the inflow of goods imported into 
China. This inflow of technology into China’s industry is close-
ly linked to its participation in global value chains. It is widely 
acknowledged that China’s foreign trade pattern results from 
the leading role China plays in international processing activi-
ties. For instance, the processing of imported inputs into goods 
for re-export, most notably in electronics and electrical machin-
ery, and also in a number of other manufacturing sectors. The 
international specialisation of China in intermediate or final 
processing and assembly was intentionally pursued through 
trade policy regulations that exempted from tariffs those im-
ports used for processing and re-export, especially by foreign 
affiliates, in order to increase domestic production (although 
initially not domestic value added) and develop successful ex-
port industries. Since the 1980s and 1990s, China’s imports 
were much more technology intensive than its exports25, and to 
a certain extent this is still true nowadays. 
China’s imports of high-technology parts and components 
are heavily concentrated in the sector of electrical machinery 
and show China’s technological dependence on the more ad-
vanced industrial economies. China’s dependence on advanced 
economies’ technology (mainly US) has been brought to the 
general attention during the current tensions between the 
United States and China over the state and course of their bilat-
eral economic relations. Due to the many interlinkages in pro-
duction processes within global supply chains, in many sectors, 
production of core components by US firms relies on sourcing 
inputs (e.g. steel, rare earths) from China, while at the same 
time Chinese producers import a number of individual parts 
(not only chips, but also a wide range of electronics, including 
passive components and optical parts)26 from the United States. 
25 F. Lemoine and D. Unal, China in the international segmentation of  produc-
tion processes, CEPII Working paper no. 2, 2012.
26 Cheng Ting-Fang, Lauly Li and Coco Liu, Nikkei staff  writers “Exclusive: 
Huawei stockpiles 12 months of  parts ahead of  US ban”, NIKKEI Asian Review, 
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The current developments of the trade war – from import 
tariffs to export bans – show that the real motive behind the 
trade war is not only or mainly the bilateral trade deficit 
the United States runs vis-à-vis China, but rather the tech-
nology transfers that China has achieved through its pecu-
liar specialisation pattern, i.e. the processing of high-tech 
imported inputs into exports. The same issue is also at the 
heart of the developments in the way a Chinese firm, Huawei 
Technologies, has been formally targeted by the US administra-
tion on issues related to national security. Huawei, the world’s 
leading telecom equipment maker, accounts for a global pro-
curement of around $67 billion a year, from a vast range of 
suppliers around the world. Huawei started towards the end 
of 2018 to build up stocks of crucial components for the year 
ahead, in order to face the uncertainties of the coming trade 
war between the United States and China. Those uncertainties 
became harsh reality when the US Department of Commerce 
announced, around mid-May this year, that it was placing the 
company on an export control list (meaning that all of Huawei’s 
American suppliers will require US government approval to sell 
to the Chinese company)27. 
The Huawei case has increased awareness of at least two facts, 
the importance of which seems to have been largely underesti-
mated before. Firstly, the recent US ban on business with key 
suppliers was anticipated by Huawei, which had prepared for 
a worst-case scenario, and in fact has contributed to further 
accelerating innovation within the company, which had already 
set a goal of developing its own versions of semiconductor de-
vices (including high-end radio frequency and optical chips, for 
which it still relies heavily on US suppliers) and now is in great-
er need of becoming more independent from all US suppliers28. 
17 May 2019.
27 A. Kharpal, “Shares of  Huawei’s American suppliers slide, but the Chinese 
giant says it can survive US blacklist”, CNBC, 17 May 2019.
28 According to the South China Morning Post, the CEO of  Huawei, Ren Zhengfei, 
said the US ban would have no impact on Huawei’s 5G plans and that its rivals 
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Secondly, the US-China trade war is likely to jeoparidise sup-
ply chains all over the world, as they are networked with firms 
from other countries (Huawei sources from many big suppli-
ers in the region, including Sony and Taiwan Semiconductor 
Manufacturing Co., the world’s largest contract chipmaker29).
Institutional and Organisational Challenges 
to Future Technology Upgrading
The previous section summarised the documented increase of 
China’s investment in knowledge (science, technology and in-
novation), but how really has it increased knowledge produc-
tion? Have the vast number of science and technology research, 
incentive and funding programmes played a significant role in 
enhancing the country’s scientific and technological strength? 
Competence and innovation are the two main outcomes of 
knowledge production (not just investment), and both work ef-
fectively in organisations that learn interactively. The 13th Five-
Year Plan, launched in March 2016, and the 13th Five-Year 
Plan on Scientific and Technological Innovation, released in 
August 2016, established a set of targets and policies for S&T 
development for 2016-202030. But how far have they gone in 
supplying or facilitating the kind of institutional changes that 
are needed to further improve the efficiency of the Chinese sys-
tem of national innovation?
First of all, it is worth remembering that technology and inno-
vation policy in China shifted dramatically in 2003, returning 
to “techno-industrial policy” that involves direct government 
interventions to shape specific industrial sectors31. This policy 
cannot catch up with the company for at least two to three years, adding that US 
politicians have underestimated the company. https://amp.scmp.com/tech/arti-
cle/3011048/huawei-founder-ren-zhengfei-says-clash-us-was-inevitable?__twit-
ter_impression=true
29 A. Kharpal (2019).
30 OECD (2015).
31 L. Chen and B. Naughton, “An institutionalized policy-making mechanism: 
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shift was formulated through a policy process that, like others 
in China, has become increasingly institutionalised. In the case 
of innovation policy, this structured policy process facilitated a 
shift to a substantially more interventionist policy32. However, 
a significant share of China’s public research is funded by firms, 
which suggests that there is sound industry-science coopera-
tion, but China’s universities and Public Reasearch Institutes 
(PRIs) are not yet very engaged in patenting activities (see pan-
els O and P in the next graph)33. There has been a surge in pat-
enting activity by Chinese firms and organisations since 200134, 
with large evidence of a strong role played by universities in the 
building of China’s national innovative capacity over the last 15 
years, and a puzzling apparent lack of contributions from the 
public sector in reinforcing China’s national innovative capac-
ity35. Under the Law on the Promotion and Transformation of 
Scientific and Technological Achievements (revised in 2015), 
the government encourages R&D institutions and higher edu-
cation institutions to transfer S&T achievements to enterprises 
or other organisations by assignment, license, investment as a 
trade-in, and other means. A study examining how collabo-
rations with universities and research institutes influence the 
ability of Chinese EMEs to develop innovation, has shown 
that institutions evolve in different ways across sub-national 
Chinese regions36. This uneven institutional evolution affects 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights, the level of 
China’s return to techno-industrial policy”, Research Policy, vol. 45, no. 10, 2016, 
pp. 2138-2152.
32 Ibid.
33 OECD (2015).
34 Mei-Chih Hu and J.A. Mathews, “China’s national innovative capacity”, Research 
Policy, vol. 37, no. 9, 2008, pp. 1465-1479.
35 Fu Xiaolan and Hongru Xiong, “Open Innovation in China: Policies and 
Practices”, Journal of  Science and Technology Policy in China, vol. 2, no. 3, 2011, 196–
218. https://doi.org/10.1108/17585521111167243.
36 M. Kafouros, Chengqi Wang, P.s Piperopoulos, Mingshen Zhang, “Academic 
collaborations and firm innovation performance in China: The role of  re-
gion-specific institutions”, Research Policy, vol. 44, no. 3, 2015, pp. 803-817.
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international openness, the quality of universities and research 
institutes across regions and thus the degree to which Chinese 
EMEs benefit from academic collaborations37. 
Despite the dramatic rise of national innovation capaci-
ty, China still performs rather badly by some international 
standards. One of these is the quality of science. Although 
the quality of science is a complex and multifaceted dimension, 
it can be easily measured by the level of scientific impact of 
publications (as a higher citation impact should be related to 
higher quality of scientific production). Among the factors that 
help raise the quality of science is cooperation among research 
institutions, more specifically international collaboration. Data 
from the OECD show that there is a strong relationship be-
tween measures of scientific research collaboration and citation 
impact. Collaboration with higher education or public research 
institutions constitutes an important source of knowledge 
transfer for large firms, both for firms that use R&D (either in-
ternally developed or externally acquired) and for those that are 
not R&D-active38. China, like several other larger G20 econo-
mies, shows low quality of science and low international collab-
oration, and it still ranks much lower than any other of the G20 
countries in both dimensions. Moreover, one of the main rea-
sons why the social and economic returns to R&D investment 
are still lower in China compared to other advanced countries is 
that the composition of R&D is much more oriented towards 
experimental development (D) rather than research (R), which 
leads to higher patentable knowledge39. 
37 Ibid.
38 OECD (2016).
39 OECD (2008).
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Fig. 1.3 - Science and Innovation in China
 
Notes: Normalised index of performance relative to the median values in the 
OECD area (Index median=100). For China, 2012 values were used for the in-
dicator (m) Wireless broadband subscriptions (per population). It is compared to 
values of December 2015 for OECD countries.
Although business expenditure on R&D as a share of gross ex-
penditure on R&D has risen significantly, with firm self-funded 
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R&D reaching 94% of BERD in 2012, the review of the im-
plementation of the Medium- and Long-Term National Plan 
for S&T Development (2006-20), carried out in 2010, noted 
that there was a need for greater vitality and business participa-
tion in technological innovation40.
One of the most important instruments in the policy mix 
adopted by China’s innovation policy over time is equity funding. 
A national SME development fund has been set up and focuses 
on support for the development of seed, start-up and growth-ori-
ented SMEs. In April 2015, China launched a national strategy 
for mass entrepreneurship and innovation, which aims to enable 
more people to start their own business41. This follows the experi-
ence of one of the largest government R&D programs that support 
R&D activities of small and medium-sized enterprises in China, 
the Innovation Fund for Small and Medium Technology-based 
Firms (Innofund). Data on Chinese manufacturing firms from 
1998 to 2007 show that Innofund-backed firms generate signif-
icantly higher technological and commercialised innovation out-
puts compared with their non-Innofund-backed counterparts and 
the same firms before winning the grant. Moreover, the changes 
in the governance of Innofund in 2005 from centralised to decen-
tralised made the effects of Innofund on technological innovation 
outputs become significantly stronger42. Research has also investi-
gated whether firms leverage public entrepreneurship investments 
to improve innovation and financial performance and found that 
firms possessing observable merits and political connections are 
more likely to receive Innofund grants.43 However, firms receiving 
high project evaluation scores and Innofund grants perform better 
than those that do not receive grants and have lower scores44. 
40 OECD (2015).
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Yanbo Wang, Jizhen Li, J.L. Furman, “Firm performance and state innovation 
funding: Evidence from China’s Innofund program”, Research Policy, vol. 46, no. 
6, 2017, pp. 1142-1161.
44 Ibid.
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Many of the challenges China is facing in its ascent to be-
coming a hub for innovation production are related to the 
institutional structure and governance of its national system 
of innovation. Although national innovation systems differ 
widely from country to country, China has a very peculiar ge-
ography of innovation that does not resemble either any system 
in advanced economies or any in emerging economies45. First 
of all, in China there is a much greater concentration of innova-
tive activity than witnessed elsewhere. The diffusion of knowl-
edge occurs within the boundaries of regions – and, more often 
than not, in highly dense and agglomerated metropolitan areas 
– rather than across regions. Innovation results mainly from 
collocating and agglomerating externalities, which facilitate the 
absorption of innovative potential from other regions rather 
than from R&D investments, human capital endowments and 
knowledge spillovers. “The concentration of innovative activity 
in Guangdong is in many ways the result of a national strategy 
designed to turn China into the workshop of the world”46.
Major institutional innovation has been progressively applied 
to the national system of S&T policy and governance. China 
has established an open and unified national S&T management 
platform, which consists of a new evaluation and inspection 
mechanism. A programme to evaluate National Engineering 
Technology Centres has been designed using a new set of in-
dicators. China has also started making use of the results of 
STI evaluation exercises to improve S&T management and 
enhance the national innovation policy design. In 2014, the 
China Publishing and Distribution Trading Cloud Platform 
was established, serving the publishing industry chain, based 
on cloud computing technology. The Ministry of Science 
and Technology (MOST) also established the National S&T 
Information System, a public information service platform to 
45 A. Rodríguez-Pose and C. Wilkie (2016).
46 R. Crescenzi and A.  Rodríguez-Pose “An ‘integrated’ framework for the com-
parative analysis of  the territorial innovation dynamics of  developed and emerg-
ing countries”, Journal of  Economic Surveys, vol. 26, no. 3, 2012, pp. 517–533.
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access reports and information, including on resources and data 
about publicly financed R&D projects47. 
One of the most fascinating research questions about the fac-
tors that foster or hinder the supply of innovation refers to the 
influence of corporate ownership on innovation activity. The 
ownership perspective has inspired a lot of research. Among the 
most interesting results, one study has shown the interplay of 
foreign owners and domestic owners in generating the “indige-
nous” capabilities for innovation. Data from 548 Chinese firms 
show that firm innovation performance is associated with the 
presence of foreign owners in the firm, as well as with the firm’s 
affiliation with a business group. The influence of state and in-
stitutional ownership on innovation performance is positive 
but lagged. Contrary to expectations, insider ownership leads 
to lower innovation performance and concentrated ownership 
has no significant impact48. 
In recent years, Chinese firms increased their spending on 
R&D substantially and worked on achieving a higher quality 
level of R&D49. Privately owned enterprises (POEs) not only 
obtain higher returns from their own R&D than majority and 
minority state-owned enterprises (SOEs), they are also able to 
increase their leading position. POEs not only produce R&D 
of the highest quality but are also the only ownership type prof-
iting from higher quality. This analysis depicts the strengths but 
also the weaknesses of the corporate sector in China50.
Research on the patenting behaviour of publically listed 
Chinese firms between 2002 and 2011 shows that the presence 
of institutional investors enhances firm innovation, and that 
47 OECD (2016).
48 Suk Bong Choi, Soo Hee Lee, and C. Williams, “Ownership and firm innova-
tion in a transition economy: Evidence from China”, Research Policy, vol. 40, no. 
3, 2011, pp. 441-452.
49 P. Boeing, E. Mueller, and P. Sandner, “China’s R&D explosion - Analyzing 
productivity effects across ownership types and over time”, Research Policy, vol 
45, no. 1, 2016, pp. 159-176.
50 Ibid.
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the effect of institutional investors on firm patenting mainly 
comes from mutual funds. The effect is more pronounced when 
product market competition is more intense: while the effect 
exists among private and minority state-owned enterprises, it 
does not appear among majority state-owned enterprises51. 
Moreover, to spur technology transfer, emerging market pol-
icymakers often require foreign firms to form joint ventures 
(JVs) with domestic firms. Through knowledge spillovers, JVs 
may reduce technology acquisition costs for domestic firms. 
Yet domestic firm revenues from JVs could discourage inno-
vation because of the “cannibalisation effect”, i.e. the tendency 
by foreign partners to benefit from the innovation output of 
JVs. In China’s auto sector, in response to fuel economy stand-
ards requiring firms to upgrade technology or sacrifice qual-
ity, firms with JVs reduced quality and price relative to their 
counterparts52.
A number of sector studies have been designed to test the 
importance of institutional factors in the innovation trajecto-
ries of individual Chinese industries, among those that have 
been more successful innovators by international standards. 
Among these sectors, China’s mobile communications indus-
try once again deserves special attention as it is now at the 
centre of the current trade and technology dispute between 
China and United States, as presented in previous sections. The 
catching-up process of latecomer Chinese firms, most notably 
Huawei53, depends on a combination of market and techno-
logical regimes. Segmented markets and generational techno-
logical change allowed domestic firms to leverage their initial 
51 Zhao Rong, Xiaokai Wu, P. Boeing, “The effect of  institutional ownership on 
firm innovation: Evidence from Chinese listed firms”, Research Policy, vol. 46, no. 
9, 2017, pp. 1533-1551.
52 S.T. Howell, “Joint ventures and technology adoption: A Chinese industrial 
policy that backfired”, Research Policy, vol. 47, no. 8, 2018, pp. 1448-1462.
53 For a simple and short story of  Huawei, you can read Zen Soo and Li Tao, 
“How Huawei went from small-time trader in Shenzhen to world’s biggest tele-
coms equipment supplier”, South China Morning Post, 18 February 2019.
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advantages on peripheral markets to catch up in core markets 
and therefore facilitated the catching-up of domestic firms with 
respect to foreign multinationals. 
Generational technological change opened windows of op-
portunity for domestic firms to catch up with foreign multina-
tionals in new product segments.54 One interesting implication 
of this study is that latecomer firms may find it difficult to catch 
up if technological changes are fully competence-destroying55. 
Therefore, the current efforts to build innovation in high-tech 
sectors dominated by disruptive technologies may raise the is-
sue of the extent to which the competences required are similar 
or different from the traditional ones held by investing firms. 
A vast literature on technology transitions within industries 
suggests that the early phases of new technologies are marked by 
periods of intense experimentation. This literature has inspired 
a study of what prompts firms to experiment across one emerg-
ing technology platform—plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) – in 
China56. The study shows that in contrast to the innovation 
trajectories of multinational and Chinese arms of joint venture 
(JV) firms, independent domestic Chinese firms are under-
taking significant experimentation across multiple levels – in-
frastructure, core system, subsystem, and component – of the 
emerging PEV technology platform. This research proposes 
the concept of “institutional complementarities” to describe 
how interactions among institutions – here the national JV 
regulation and local market support and subsidies—may have 
turned regional markets into protected laboratories, extending 
the incubation periods for independent domestic firm experi-
mentation. This suggests that, in order to scale beyond regional 
54 Daitian Li, G. Capone, and F. Malerba, “The long march to catch-up: A histo-
ry-friendly model of  China’s mobile communications industry”, Research Policy, 
vol. 48, no. 3, 2019, pp. 649-664.
55 Ibid.
56 J.P. Helveston, Y. Wang, V.J. Karplus, and E.R.H. Fuchs, “Institutional com-
plementarities: The origins of  experimentation in China’s plug-in electric vehicle 
industry”, Research Policy, vol. 48, no. 1, 2019, pp. 206-222.
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markets, consolidation induced by national policy standardisa-
tion may be required for PEV innovations57.
Some research has also explored the impact of innovation 
on future firm performance and in particular how heteroge-
nous risk drives the firm innovation–survival relationship using 
a large sample of new entrepreneurial firms in China58. Results 
show that innovation increases the probability of survival. 
Cautious innovators are found to survive longer and contribute 
to higher social welfare via gains in firm efficiency. In contrast, 
risky innovators are less likely to survive, are less efficient, and 
are only sometimes compensated for their risk in terms of high-
er profits59.
Besides the role of institutions, there is one further dimen-
sion to the innovation process, i.e. the organisational structure 
of firms. According to Lundvall, “most Chinese firms operate 
with hierarchical forms of organisation, and there is little room 
for creative contributions from employees”60 and therefore little 
room for individual and organisational learning. As China is 
now a society with a rapidly increasing number of highly ed-
ucated people, the higher individual learning reward (besides 
the monetary reward) in foreign firms compared to domestic 
firms might imply a divergence in the ability of domestic firms 
to achieve organisational learning compared to foreign invest-
ed firms. Corporate governance has been considered one of 
the major factors impacting the development of technological 
capability within firms, explaining the limited catching-up in 
high technology sectors – and to a lesser extent in medium-high 
technology.61 One of the major challenges for China’s innova-
57 Ibid.
58 A. Howell, “‘Indigenous’ innovation with heterogeneous risk and new firm 
survival in a transitioning Chinese economy”, Research Policy, vol. 44, no. 10, 2015, 
pp. 1866-1876.
59 Ibid.
60 B.-Å. Lundvall (2016), p. 382.
61 Yangao Xiao, A. Tylecote, and J. Liu, “Why not greater catch-up by Chinese 
firms? The impact of  IPR, corporate governance and technology intensity on 
late-comer strategies”, Research Policy, vol. 42, no. 3, 2013, pp. 749-764.
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tion policies is to “realise the potential of combining this major 
effort to promote STI-mode of learning with a stronger empha-
sis on the Doing, Using and Interacting mode (DUI-mode)”62. 
Organisational space is also at the heart of the technological 
catching-up in leading automotive groups, where it helped the 
building of technological capabilities by encouraging the mo-
bilisation and integration of internal resources and promotes 
group-wide synergy for an effective internalisation of acquired 
assets63.
Five fundamental activities are involved in the national in-
novation process – R&D, implementation, end-use, education, 
linkage – whose overall performance implications depend, rath-
er than simply on the role and performance of particular actors, 
institutions and policies, on system-level characteristics, includ-
ing the distribution of these activities within the system, the 
organisational boundaries around them, coordination mech-
anisms, evolutionary processes, and the effectiveness of the 
system in introducing, diffusing and exploiting technological 
innovations64. Some research has emphasised the presence of 
inconsistencies and perverse incentives that policymakers must 
address to achieve their development goals65. 
There has been growing attention in recent research to the 
similarities of socio-technical transitions in various parts of 
the world, which suggests that too much emphasis might have 
been given to the specificities of national innovation systems, 
and proposes an alternative “global” regime perspective66. One 
such study shows the case of an unsuccessful transition in the 
62 B.-Å. Lundvall (2016), p. 382.
63 Kyung-Min Nam, “Compact organizational space and technological catch-up: 
Comparison of  China’s three leading automotive groups”, Research Policy, vol. 44, 
no. 1, 2015, pp. 258-272.
64 Xielin Liu and S. White, “Comparing innovation systems: a framework and 
application to China’s transitional context”, Research Policy, vol. 30, no. 7, 2001, 
pp. 1091-1114.
65 Ibid.
66 L. Fuenfschilling and  C. Binz, “Global socio-technical regimes”, Research Policy, 
vol. 47, no. 4, 2018, pp. 735-749.
Beijing: Ready for Global Technology Leadership? 37
Chinese wastewater sector. Key decisions on wastewater infra-
structure expansion were not only influenced by path-depend-
encies stemming from China’s national context, but equally (or 
even more critically) by the dominant rationality of the water 
sector’s global socio-technical regime67.
Contemporary research on entrepreneurship has showed 
that social capital can improve firm activities such as techno-
logical innovation. In a study on the impact of social capital on 
firms’ technological innovation performance in China, with the 
data from 249 publically listed Chinese firms that have received 
venture capital investment, results show that both venture cap-
italists’ social ties and entrepreneurs’ social ties negatively affect 
these firms’ technological innovation performance, including 
total patents granted, R&D expenditure, and total factor pro-
ductivity. In other words, venture capitalists’ social ties as well 
as entrepreneurs’ social ties actually impede, rather than facili-
tate their firms’ technological innovation68. This study suggests 
there are many different dimensions that need to be analysed 
in future research on the role of ties in the ascent of China to a 
knowledge economy.
The history of innovation policy and performance in China 
shows that the country has adopted a quite well-developed pol-
icy mix that covers all areas relevant to innovation and includes 
many instruments that have been adopted in many OECD 
countries. The transition of China to a more innovation-driv-
en growth model will require further improvement of the 
framework conditions for innovation. From the guiding prin-
ciples suggested by the OECD back in 2007 in their Review 
of Innovation Policy written jointly with the Chinese Ministry 
of Science and Technology69, some recommendations on the 
67 Ibid.
68 Zhenzhong Ma, Lei Wang and Keith Cheung, “The paradox of  social capital 
in China: venture capitalists and entrepreneurs’ social ties and public listed firms’ 
technological innovation performance”, Asian Journal of  Technology Innovation, vol. 
26, no. 3, 2018, pp. 306-324.
69 OECD (2016).
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need to improve governance of science and innovation policy 
were followed, but not those pointing to the need to promote 
more market-based innovative clusters beyond the fences of sci-
ence and technology parks, to move to a more open innovation 
model. The current trends suggest the Chinese government has 
somehow centralised the structure of the Chinese innovation 
system, has not avoided high-technology myopia and is more 
fascinated than ever by the ambition to become a world tech-
nology leader.
2.  China’s Technological Prowess: 
      Implications for Global Alliances 
 Yu Jie
Many discussions of power shifts and the Thucydides Trap re-
volve around the rivalry for economic and military suprema-
cy between Beijing and Washington. While President Trump’s 
erratic tactics to attack the Chinese technologies sector has 
changed the frontier of a clash of two titans.
The fear that China will dominate crucial technologies is 
now more widespread than ever in the West. The US political 
elites, along with leaders from the so-called Five Eyes coun-
tries, believe that China’s strident “Made in China 2025” in-
dustrial upgrade strategy introduced by Beijing in 2015 poses 
an existential threat to the US monopoly over high-tech sectors. 
China’s technological prowess, together with its distinctive po-
litical system at home, is now reshaping the global technologi-
cal and economic order.
In today’s highly integrated global economy, it is simply not 
feasible for the US to single-handedly mount what would effec-
tively be a technological blockade against China. It would need 
help from elsewhere. However, President Trump’s willingness to 
tear up agreements with long-standing allies, in Europe as well 
as in Asia, makes it unlikely that help would be forthcoming.
That is a particular concern for the EU and Washington’s 
East Asian alliances. Many are suspicious of Beijing’s intentions 
and would instinctively prefer to entrust their national security 
to the US. But they are also acutely aware that their economies’ 
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prosperity depends increasingly heavily on staying on good 
terms with China. If they no longer trust the US’ ability to pro-
vide stable global leadership and a regional security umbrella, 
they will find China’s gravitational pull even harder to resist.
Technological collaboration between China and the West is 
not an emerging phenomena and greatly helped China to ac-
celerate its economic success after Deng Xiaoping’s landmark 
reforms and opening-up since 1978. After forty years, China 
has gradually transformed itself from a mere pupil of the West 
into a formidable competitor in some key technological sectors. 
China’s technology prowess has posed some fundamental 
challenges to the conventional understanding of the relation-
ship between technology and governance and the roles the mar-
ket and the government play in facilitating innovation. And 
these challenges will inevitably redefine how domestic politics 
and international affairs are shaped by technology innovation. 
In particular, it will require states to consider with whom they 
want to collaborate or compete; and how the collaboration or 
the competition will pan out.
This essay seeks to explore a key question – will China’s 
emerging technological prowess become a convenient vehicle 
for Beijing to forge diplomatic partnerships? Or, quite the re-
verse, will China put its potential partners in jeopardy precisely 
because of an unusual combination of an authoritarian regime 
and technology expertise? It will also investigate what the ex-
isting technological collaboration has been; and what the main 
drivers are for current controversies about China’s technological 
advancement; and to what extent this technological coopera-
tion and competition will co-exist in years to come, in particu-
lar, what would Europe’s role be in placing itself between the 
two titans?
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The Good Old Days
Technology developments have always been positioned at the 
heart of the Chinese government; the 1979 economic reforms 
and opening-up also opened the doors for China to acquire 
advanced technologies from many developed countries. As a 
China watcher observed, this pursuit of self-reliance regarding 
technologies came well before the latest “Made In China 2025” 
Industrial Strategy1. 
Chinese leaders realise that technological leadership is one 
of the bases of power, something first captured in China by the 
idea of “two bombs and one satellite,” which showed the Soviets 
and the Americans that China was a peer in strategic technol-
ogy and did not need them2. The focus now is on surpassing 
the United States in a broad range of technologies while again 
asserting that China does not need the United States’ help to 
do this.
Nearly thirty years ago, China emerged from the tumultu-
ous year of 1989. The Chinese government had an industrial 
strategy of acquiring and domesticating foreign technologies. It 
had very little expertise in terms of what kind of technologies 
the Chinese government and companies had in their minds. 
Instead, both foreign governments and companies played a ma-
jor role in shaping the nascent developments of Chinese tech-
nological acquisitions.
From the author’s initial findings back to 2016, central gov-
ernment institutions in Beijing played a decisive role in shap-
ing China’s industrial and technology development policies as 
well as in determining broader international collaborations3. 
1 N. Thomas, “Mao Redux: The Enduring Relevance of  Self-Reliance in China”, 
Macro Polo, 25 April 2019.
2 M. Chan, “The day China entered the nuclear age”, South China Morning Post, 
17 October 2014.
3 Y. Jie, Partnership or Partnerships? An Assessment of  China-EU Relations between 2001 
and 2013 with Cases Studies on Their Collaborations on Climate Change and Renewable 
Energy, London School of  Economics and Political Science, London, September 
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Foreign companies that intended to secure a lion’s share of the 
Chinese market were fully aware of the enormous power that 
the central ministries have to shape policy outcomes. 
As a result, foreign conglomerates often treated the Chinese 
government’s ministries as the first choice for collaborative part-
ners when they initially entered the Chinese market. Successful 
alliances between the central ministries and the foreign compa-
nies mostly took place at the very early stage of developments 
for any leading technological sector inside China. 
This was largely because formulating and executing policies 
in those particular industries were daunting challenges to the 
government agencies due to their lack of industrial expertise 
in both sectors. The European enterprises played the role of 
“information provider” by introducing technological standards 
and industrial practices to the central ministries. By providing 
information, the European companies enabled their preferred 
policies to be introduced; and their products were adopted by 
the Chinese authorities.
For example4, the Danish wind energy giant, VESTAS, set an 
exemplary case for technological alliance building between the 
Chinese government and foreign companies. As demonstrated 
by other scholars and industrial reports, VESTAS’ influence on 
China’s renewable energy policy between 2009 and 2010 was 
not just a rare case in the early stages of China’s renewables 
development – the impact of foreign companies on China’s in-
dustrial upgrade also extended into other sectors such as the 
high-speed railway and automotive industries5.
VESTAS managed to act as an insightful information provid-
er, which was similar to the way in which some Chinese SOEs 
2014.
4 Ibid.
5 R. Lema, A. Berger, H. Schmitz, China’s Impact on the Global Wind Power Industry, 
German Development Institute, Discussion Paper, 16/2012; International 
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), “Regional Report on Wind Energy: China”, 
accessed at: https://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/
GWEC_China.pdf   
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did with their corresponding governmental departments. As a 
Chinese media outlet asserted, “the main reason for VESTAS’ 
success in collaborating with the Chinese government was 
China’s nascent development of renewable energy”6.
New Era, New Challenges
The foreign conglomerates’ technological collaborations with 
their Chinese counterparts were not free from difficulties and 
bureaucratic predicaments. Collaborations with Chinese coun-
terparts had not been insulated from the usual difficulties that 
foreign companies encountered in China, such as the increas-
ingly protectionist approach taken by the Chinese authorities, 
the lack of transparency in policy implementation and IPR 
violations. 
Things became far more difficult for foreign companies when 
the Chinese government began to launch its “Indigenous in-
novation” campaign. There was a sea change due to the rapid 
progress that China’s domestic technology manufacturers made 
in a relatively short space of time. The “Indigenous Innovation” 
campaign was a turning point for China’s technology collabo-
rations with foreign partners. 
The Chinese government commenced for foreign companies 
when the Chinese government began to launch its “Indigenous 
innovat国家中长期科技发展规划 (2006-2020) in 2006, in-
tending to advocate for indigenous innovation and create an 
egnnovative society (创新型社会)新型社会6-2020) y 2020.
Central to this program, Beijing took a much stronger pro-
tectionist approach to ensure that domestic manufacturers were 
treated favourably. It dismissed foreign conglomerates’ claims 
that that they were undermining foreign companies’ commer-
cial interests, and their futile efforts to protest against their 
6 “维斯塔斯牵手中国电科院风电研究” (“VESTAS advices wind energy to 
NDRC’s Institute to China’s Electricity Research”), China Energy Daily, 13 June 
2011.
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decisions. Such discrimination against foreign enterprises also 
largely exists in all technology sectors in which the Chinese 
government would like to give priority for development. 
There is nothing wrong with China developing “indigenous 
innovation”, but the centrally planned programme includes 
measures, incentives and other forms of market protection to 
support domestic enterprises, which erode free market norms 
and possibly WTO rules. For instance, under the initiative, 
the Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corps, one 
of China’s handful of domestic semiconductor manufacturers, 
received a subsidy worth over US$100 million in 2017 alone7.
“Made In China 2025” aims to achieve China’s gradual eco-
nomic transformation from low-cost manufacturing to great 
innovation power, which remains the top priority of President 
Xi Jinping and his comrades for the years to come. However, 
such prowess has caused more fear than appreciation across ad-
vanced economies in the US and Europe. As an industrial de-
velopment guideline, Beijing has its eyes on 10 strategically and 
technologically important sectors, including information tech-
nology, biotech, robotics, aerospace and clean-energy vehicles.
Beijing is tailoring the initiative to produce national cham-
pions that can lead China’s dominance in the above 10 sectors, 
with the aim of eventually replacing foreign technology with 
domestic suppliers. The key message here is a strong sense of 
self-reliance.
In recent months, China found itself fighting an economic 
slowdown coupled with an unexpected and enduring trade war 
with the US. President Xi began to offer an approach to revive 
the economy – a more pro-market rhetoric combined with a 
package of RMB 2 trillion (US$294 billion) in tax cuts for pri-
vate enterprises8. And those companies specialised in techno-
logical sectors are given priorities. However, the state will still 
7 Y. Xie, “China’s top chip maker SMIC sees revenue grow as state subsidies 
surge amid trade war”, South China Morning Post, 10 August 2018.
8 “China to cut taxes to support private sector: Xinhua”, Reuters, 9 November 
2018.
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direct where private companies can invest and how much they 
can borrow. Instead of following the market, entrepreneurs 
must be led by the Party. 
The Party is also explicitly moving beyond just regulating 
private enterprises to mapping out their future. The Chinese 
leadership is prescribing industrial policies that actively man-
age private enterprises by channelling capital and manipulating 
cash flows into innovation-driven industries, notably informa-
tion technology, AI and robotics. 
Interestingly, the phrase “Made in China 2025” was conspic-
uously missing from all of Beijing’s propaganda campaign due 
to pressure from Washington, which has jumped on China’s 
tech ambitions as a target in the trade conflict. But Beijing’s 
commitment to focusing on private companies entering inno-
vation industries has demonstrated that Made In China 2025 
will continue without its formal name.
Political elites in Beijing stress that a party-led and state-dom-
inated economy is fundamental both to the future growth 
of the world’s second-largest economy and consolidation of 
Communist Party’s legitimacy to rule the country. China has 
decisively ignored backlash against its policies from its major 
trading partners and competitors.
Beijing’s protectionist approach has paid off to some extent, 
in particular when it comes to collaborating with Southeast 
Asia and many developing countries on technologies. For ex-
ample, the contentious debate about 5G and Huawei has taken 
a totally opposite direction from what the US expected in some 
parts of the world. In Southeast Asia, where Huawei estimates 
there will be 80 million customers within the next year and 
US$1.2 trillion in business opportunities over the next five 
years, Washington’s fears have had little impact9.
So when picking technologies, it’s tempting for govern-
ments to choose the cheapest option, especially when the deal 
9 M. Tobin, “My way or the Huawei: how US ultimatum over China’s 5G giant 
fell flat in Southeast Asia”, South China Morning Post, 20 April 2019.
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is sweetened by the promise of local employment opportunities 
– in Malaysia, for example, Huawei has already created more 
than 2,500 jobs10. For many, the choice between Chinese or 
Western technology is a matter of economics, not geopolitics.
It’s not just that countries in Southeast Asia are less suspicious 
of China’s motives. Many have been seduced by its technolog-
ical prowess. Huawei claims a 12 to 18 month advantage over 
its competitors, promising those who sign up for its technology 
the fastest and most advanced 5G networks in the world11.
Thailand hopes to roll out a Huawei-led 5G service by 2020 
and is already carrying out joint research with the firm in its 
hi-tech Sriracha district12; Singapore’s M1 service, Malaysia’s 
Maxis and Indonesia’s Telkomsel have all signed up for trial 
services with the company13; and in the Philippines, a Huawei-
backed service is to be introduced by the leading wireless pro-
vider Globe Telecom as early as the second quarter of this year14.
And not only is its technology more advanced than its 
Western competitors, it comes at a fraction of the cost – es-
pecially for those nations already using Chinese technology in 
their existing communications infrastructure. Beijing also in-
tends to add the Digital Silk Road as a key attraction to existing 
customers in developing countries15. 
However, inherent tensions in Chinese policy and China’s unique 
political system make Beijing’s desire for a leading role in interna-
tional technology alliances more complicated and problematic.
10 T. Sukumaran, Malaysia welcomes Chinese tech giant Huawei despite Western 
concerns, South China Morning Post, 15 April 2019.
11 Zen Soon, “With the power to change the world, here’s why the US and China 
are fighting over our 5G future”, South China Morning Post, 17 April 2019.
12 M. Kishimoto, “Huawei joins Thailand’s first 5G trial”, Nikkei Asian Review, 9 
February 2019.
13 Huawei, “Indonesia’s Telkomsel Signs MOU with Huawei to Cooperate on 
Building a Fully Connected Digital Indonesia”, 25 February 2019.
14 C. Venzon, Philippines’ wireless leader pushes on with Huawei 5G launch, 
Nikkei Asian Review, 12 February 2019.
15 B. Harding, China’s Digital Silk Road and Southeast Asia, Washington DC, Center 
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 15 February 2019.
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Beijing’s underlying position is considerably weaker. In the 
minds of many Beijing represents an autocratic political regime, 
so different from the more democratic forms of governance that 
have prevailed in other countries associated with technological 
innovation power in the modern era. In terms of the political 
and legal features that might reasonably be expected of a coun-
try aspiring to play a central role in driving global technology 
alliances, China does not inspire a high level of confidence16. 
To date, Beijing has shown scarcely any respect for intellec-
tual property rights or imposing stringent enforcement of busi-
ness contract obligations. The country’s governance structure 
is not known for transparency or accountability. Quite the re-
verse, the ruling Communist Party has always been dictatorial 
in nature and often opaque in policy implementation.
A World Bank survey of global governance indicators recent-
ly ranked China in just the 46th percentile for the rule of law17, 
while Transparency International places China 77th out of 180 
nations in its corruption perceptions index18. Indeed, over the 
medium term, it is not even clear whether political stability in 
China can be assured.
China’s rulers do not deny the issue. Indeed, at the annual 
meeting of the Communist Party’s Central Committee on 23 
October 2014, under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, 
the governance problem was noted and a formal commitment 
made to firmly establish “rule of law” by 202019. 
In practice, however, deeds matter more than words. The 
Party clearly did not have Western-style democracy in mind. 
“We absolutely cannot indiscriminately copy foreign rule-of-law 
16 Y. Jie, Party Versus Market: Xi Fails to Resolve China’s Contradictions, London, 
Chatham House, 16 March 2019.
17 The World Bank, Doing Business. Measuring Business Regulations, China.
18 E. Morton, “Transparency International: China climbs two places in global 
corruption perception ranking as President Xi Jinping wages war on graft”, South 
China Morning Post, 22 February 2018.
19 Communique of  the 4th Plenary Session of  the 18th Central Committee of  
CPC, China.org.cn, 2 December 2014.
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concepts and models”, declared the Central Committee20. The 
goal, it seemed, was to refine Party control, not dilute it. As The 
Economist commented: “Official English translations refer to 
the importance of the ‘rule of law’. But Mr Xi’s tactics appear 
better suited to a different translation of the Chinese term, Yi 
Fa Zhi Guo (依法治国): ‘Rule by law’. His aim is to strengthen 
law to make the Party more powerful, not to constrain it”21.
In this light, only the most audacious technology entrepre-
neurs or innovators would see today’s China as fertile ground 
for their talents and money.
If Beijing is to become a fully-fledged innovative power, it 
must implement reforms that go to the heart of the Communist 
Party’s distinctive model of political and economic manage-
ment22. It would have to make the country’s governance struc-
ture more transparent and accountable, with more emphasis on 
genuine respect for intellectual property rights. 
It would have to tone down elements of economic national-
ism in its “Made in China 2025” Industrial Strategy, to reassure 
apprehensive neighbours in order to build aspired-to technol-
ogy alliances. It would also need to commit more funding to 
original research and development in all technology sectors, but 
without the bravado and the boastful rhetoric. The current lead-
ership should heed the words of wisdom from Deng Xiaoping, 
when it comes to developing its indigenous technologies. “Hide 
your strength, bide your time” will not do much harm.
And above all it would have to put more effort into cultivat-
ing a truly efficient and open domestic market environment to 
permit real competition, in order to enhance China’s appeal 
as an innovative power. All these steps would risk eroding the 
Party’s grasp on power and data control at home.
More rule of law would mean less rule by law. And more 
market liberalisation in the technology sector would weaken a 
20 Ibid.
21 “China with legal characteristics”, The Economist, 1 December 2014.
22 Y. Jie, China Can No Longer Afford an Indecisive Approach to Economic Reform, 
London, Chatham House, 2 January 2019.
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critical tool of leadership control – the government’s long-stand-
ing ability to manage market conditions and the use of data.
Domestically, data-use control has meant direct authority 
over what kind of technology sector Beijing would be in favour 
of developing and which tech companies the political elites 
are happy to incorporate into the Party machine. This enables 
the state to allocate resources to favoured entrepreneurs and to 
minimise its governance costs. 
Internationally, control means an insulated market where 
only the Party’s favoured technology enterprises dominate. A 
sense of technological repression is an emerging snag in Beijing’s 
machinery of political autocracy. It is not at all clear how much 
political authority the ruling class is prepared to sacrifice for the 
sake of true technological innovation without strict oversight 
from the Party.
Beijing’s technology statecraft thus operates under some 
deeply rooted domestic constraints. The hope, plainly, is to en-
courage wider alliances in the use of Chinese technologies or 
Chinese tech companies abroad without seriously threatening 
Party control at home. To say the least, the Party is now walking 
on eggs. 
In effect, the Chinese government has been trying to make as 
few concessions as possible in terms of economic or political re-
form, hoping that the nation’s economic size alone will support 
international technology alliances with Chinese characteristics. 
Whether a compromise like that can work effectively over the 
longer term remains an open question.
The Long-Lasting Impacts
Innovation has now become an indispensable element in ex-
panding a country’s global influence. In the case of China, it in-
tends to shift itself from a manufacturing hub to an innovation 
powerhouse. Beijing’s intentions and deeds will surely bring 
long-lasting effects in the global race to technological premier-
ship. Yet, it is far too early to conclude that China’s actions do 
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more harm than good. Instead, it brings a whole set of new 
issues that have to be dealt with in both developed and devel-
oping countries.
The first implication is a re-assessment of the relationship 
between personal freedom and innovation. As conventional 
wisdom holds, there is a positive causal relationship between 
individual freedoms – the greater the personal freedoms a so-
ciety enjoys, the greater innovation derives from that society.
However, China has taken every possible step to challenge 
this established convention. Mr Xi’s decision to abolish presi-
dential term limits has dashed Western elites’ hopes of China 
experiencing a democratic transition with greater personal po-
litical freedoms. The lack of institutional constraints and differ-
ing opinions create the danger that hubris may infect govern-
ance. Leadership by control has not had an illustrious history.
China’s ample supply of innovation talents builds a solid 
foundation in its quest for global technology supremacy, yet 
its tightened control over personal freedoms could undermine 
other global partners’ desires to collaborate with China over 
both the short and longer terms. It seems that both innova-
tion and control are flourishing simultaneously in China. As 
pointed out by an expert, “the unanswered question for China 
is whether it is possible to have scientific innovation without 
personal rights”23.
The second implication comes from the relationship between 
the market and the government. China and the West have es-
sentially taken two different paths in terms of investments in in-
novation. Beijing runs a nationalist and heavily government-led 
approach in driving innovation. It prescribes industrial policies 
that actively manage Chinese private enterprises in the technol-
ogy sectors by channelling capital and manipulating cash flows 
into innovation-driven industries. 
23 J. Lewis, “Technological Competition and China”, Washington DC, Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 30 November 2018.
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The Chinese government has moved explicitly beyond regu-
lating innovation enterprises, which remain the most dynam-
ic elements of its economy. It continues to direct where those 
companies can invest and how much they can borrow. Instead 
of following the market, the technology entrepreneurs must be 
led by the state, hence the Party.
Whereas the West in general still believes that government 
remains merely a provider of public goods, not an investor in 
innovation. There is a strong preference to cut government 
spending and wholly rely on the private sector to generate cash 
flows and innovation. It is futile to whine about China’s mis-
deeds regarding innovation. Instead, for China’s competitors, it 
is perhaps time to reassess the role the market and the govern-
ment have played and offer tangible solutions.
The third implication comes in the form of global alliances. 
As China moves into a central place to challenge the existing 
international order, it is inevitable that many of the partners and 
alliances of the West will have to re-think their relationships with 
a technologically brilliant but more politically assertive China. 
A Middle Kingdom that does not share the same values ably 
exploits the flaws of a rule-based international order. A China 
determined to create its own indigenous industry therefore un-
dermines the technological dominance of the United States.
Some global alliances might likely be determined by eco-
nomic viability rather than by shared political ideologies. As 
discussed earlier, a partnership with China on innovation col-
laboration is about economics as much as about geopolitics, as 
in some of the Southeast Asian countries.
Implications for Europe
To date, Europe has shown little interest in involving itself in 
the global power struggle between Beijing and Washington 
as the author pointed out in her recent piece24. The majority 
24 Y Jie, “EU-China relations require a cautious reset”, European Leadership 
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of European governments take a nuanced view of the China 
challenge; many share the US’ concerns over the direction the 
Middle Kingdom is taking under President Xi Jinping, includ-
ing on domestic market access and unfair competition from 
state-owned and state-backed Chinese companies. Yet internal 
divisions over China have long since troubled Europeans. 
Given their limited security interests in the Asia-Pacific, and 
large economic interest in China, many Europeans have feared 
the impact of China’s rise on international democratic govern-
ance norms and on the rule of law.
In recent months, the EU has also found itself under in-
creased pressure to comply with American demands to treat the 
Huawei 5G network with caution. Ongoing controversies over 
other Chinese investments have added even more uncertainty 
to the Sino-European relationship.
This emerging shift in global alliances will prove to be im-
mensely challenging for the EU and for the EU’s already fragile 
unity. The European single market remains extremely attrac-
tive to Chinese companies and the government. In the eyes of 
many Chinese investors, the EU represents a secure home for 
their investments. In particular, a preferred partner for China’s 
ever-growing appetite for technology acquisitions.
Beijing is eager to be recognised by established economies 
and has high hopes for European endorsement of its global am-
bitions on every front, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, as 
recently demonstrated by Italy – a decision raising eyebrows in 
European capitals, as well as in Washington.
The EU has every reason to view China’s technological am-
bitions with anxiety. It harbours deep suspicions about China’s 
broader strategic calculation beyond its commercial gains. 
Many Europeans perceive Beijing’s “Made in China 2025” in-
dustrial upgrade initiative as posing a direct challenge to the 
EU’s own “Fourth Industrial Revolution”.
Network, 8 April 2019.
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Judging by the increasingly strong rhetoric coming from 
Brussels and other European capitals, China’s might and mon-
ey has spread more fear than it has admiration. This all too 
easily feeds into the narrative that many challenges faced by 
the EU are a direct result of China’s economic and innovation 
ambitions – and a threat to the liberal democratic values that 
Europeans uphold.
The EU’s engagement with China stems from its neighbour-
hood policy, in which the democratisation process, through 
political reform, re-integrated the formerly Communist East 
European states. This approach generates great suspicion in 
the Chinese public and political elites where it is viewed as a 
fundamental challenge to state stability, which is based on the 
Chinese Communist Party’s absolute legitimacy and govern-
mental role. Europeans cannot afford to ignore the omnipres-
ence of the Party, nor pretend that significant conceptual differ-
ences on democracy and political freedom do not exist.
Brussels’ hand will be strengthened if it can agree on the 
planned Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with 
the US. That is still far from certain – but it would com-
mand Beijing’s attention and respect by enabling Brussels and 
Washington to join forces in setting the global technological 
agenda. Conversely, failure would signal weakened Western 
commitment and resolve, from which Beijing would be quick 
to draw the consequences.
Conclusion
As China’s military, economic, and financial power have grown, 
it has been obvious that Beijing would not accept all global 
institutions and standards exactly as they are configured today. 
And importantly, this would be true even without Xi Jinping in 
power. China’s sheer size, weight, and self-perception of its own 
interests will inevitably lead the Middle Kingdom to expect 
changes in the governance of international institutions and, in 
other words, the rules of the game. These changes, in particular 
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on the technology front, have come much earlier than the rest 
of the world expected.
And a more ambitious China cannot be a “status quo” or 
static power. Beijing seems to believe that a recipe for quick 
success will come out of the technology race with the estab-
lished powers while building partnerships with a select number 
of developing economies.
The conventional thinking about the relationship between 
personal freedoms and innovation are profoundly changed by 
an authoritarian regime like China and by the populations who 
use the technology dimension to challenge incumbents in the 
liberal democratic West.
China’s words and deeds in the quest for technological su-
premacy also disrupt the established understanding about the 
ties between the market and the government regarding techno-
logical innovation. The perennial debate between Keynes and 
Hayek is now being extended into the realm of technological 
innovation. 
And lastly, China’s allure in rapid technological progress has 
also re-set the tent of global partnerships. Many of the mid-
dle powers will inevitably re-think with whom they would like 
to set up partnerships. They will have to balance ideological 
divisions with realism about how much they can change the 
Chinese government’s outlook and political choices while en-
joying the economical and efficient technologies offered by 
China’s domestic talents.
Whether the EU can realistically aspire to go further and 
develop a more comprehensive and coherent strategy for engag-
ing with China on the technological front is less clear. The EU 
today is stumbling from crisis to crisis – over mass migration, 
probable UK withdrawal and the rise of political populism. All 
this is draining political energy and confidence, causing the EU 
to increasingly turn inwards and even calling into question its 
future institutional survival. 
Nor do recent trends in China inspire optimism. Under 
President Xi, China has adopted a stridently nationalistic 
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stance, which may intensify if its economic performance deteri-
orates further. Faced with the paradox between the centrality of 
the Party and market forces, Xi promises both a stronger Party 
and a freer market. Life as a great power with publicly stat-
ed leadership aims and reform ambitions is not comfortable. 
Its technological advancements may well bring the addition-
al means to govern, yet simultaneously more controversies on 
how to handle those technologies with care. 

3.   Competing Over Leadership: 
      China vs the US
 James A. Lewis
How to deal with China is the central strategic problem of the 
next decade, perhaps even longer. China seeks to reorder the 
world to serve its interests. The issue is not whether China will 
be powerful (that is a given), but how China’s leaders will exer-
cise that power, and whether Western nations can shape China’s 
behaviour.
China is a challenger and opponent for the US. This in itself 
is not objectionable. What is objectionable is how China com-
petes, and how unscrupulous its rulers are in the actions they 
take to maintain power. China’s human rights record should 
trouble any democracy – Orwellian surveillance and having 
almost two million people in re-education camps because of 
their religion is a chilling reminder of Europe’s own unhappy 
experiences and too often greeted with an unflattering passivity 
– but these actions by the Chinese Communist Party reflect the 
larger domestic political dilemmas facing China’s leadership as 
they struggle to maintain control. 
The central problem for the Chinese Communist Party 
is how to ensure the Party’s continued rule. Xi Jinping, who 
before taking office studied the reasons for the demise of the 
Soviet Union in order to avoid them, uses a variety of measures 
to maintain Party control. These include expanding controls 
on information and speech, abetted by technology, aggressive 
mercantilism supported by government subsidies and industrial 
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espionage, accompanied by appeals to the nationalist sentiment 
that remains powerful in China. Continued economic growth 
and technological improvement is crucial for the narrative that 
supports unchallenged Party rule, and it is these domestic polit-
ical forces that have helped create and frame the technological 
competition with the US.
The competition between the US and China is also the result 
of decisions by the Chinese government to assert its dominance 
regionally and to challenge the post-1945 world order, built by 
the US and its allies and believed by China to be designed to 
advance US economic and military interests. This more con-
frontational policy is unlikely to change in the foreseeable fu-
ture. China’s new posture creates many problems for the United 
States and other nations, including the problem of how to re-
duce the flow of Western technology for potentially sensitive 
military applications to a potential military competitor.
This is more than a military contest. It can be seen as a con-
tinuation of the long contest between two economic and polit-
ical systems that differ markedly on the role and rights of party, 
state and citizen, but it is not a repetition of the Cold War. We 
are not in a bipolar world, ideology is not the central issue in 
this contest, and the economies of the two countries are deeply 
intertwined. The trajectory of each system suggests that in the 
near term, China will grow stronger and the US will decline, 
but China’s continued rise is neither preordained nor assured. 
China’s economy has grown because of a combination of 
government policies that date back to Deng Xiaoping’s open-
ing to the West. These include heavy investment in companies, 
infrastructure, research and education, barriers to trade and 
foreign investment, and a massive effort to acquire Western 
technology, including the use of major and long-lasting espio-
nage campaigns. At first, most nations and companies ignored 
China’s behaviour because its economy was small and because 
of a desire to preserve access to China’s rapidly growing market. 
As China has grown (and grown more assertive) there is less 
tolerance in the US, and mercantilist policies and espionage 
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guarantee tension with the US and other nations, particularly 
as China positions itself as a military challenger (in the region) 
and seeks greater influence and control in global institutions 
and rules. China’s willingness to spend to support economic 
growth and to use its coercive powers (particularly in manipu-
lating Western companies and governments by granting or de-
nying market access) make it a formidable opponent.  
Deng’s decision to relax government control and open 
China’s economy to foreign participation is the most impor-
tant factor in explaining the growth of China’s technology base. 
China is still dependent on the West for advanced technology. 
If China had decided to continue a socialist industrial policy 
with firms directly managed by the government, growth would 
have been slow. If China is moving back to an economic model 
where government plays a more directive role (a move moti-
vated by the domestic political imperative to retain Party con-
trol), this has implications for China’s continued growth and 
modernisation.     
China is the last Leninist state, and while by no means an 
adherent of Marxism, it is still using the techniques and tools 
of Leninism for public control and to maintain party domi-
nance even as it has largely abandoned the dogma of Marxist-
Leninism. Leninism and the Comintern still shape the world 
view of China’s leaders, but this view is also conditioned by 
a longer Chinese history that in the current national narra-
tive emphasises China’s “century of humiliation” at the hands 
of Western imperialism and its return to an “era that will see 
China move closer to the center of the world stage”, e.g. the cen-
tral polity for world affairs.
This helps explain one of China’s signal successes in shaping 
global opinion. China has persuaded the world of its inevitable 
rise. This is a triumph of propaganda, and as with many other 
pronouncements of success from Beijing, it deserves a skeptical 
look. Statistics from China are shaped to serve political ends 
and are routinely inflated. The argument, to paraphrase critics 
of the Soviet Union, that things today are better than they were 
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ten years ago, therefore they will be better yet ten years hence 
is contingent on assumptions that current trends will hold con-
stant. The engine that propelled China’s amazing economic rise 
(albeit from a very low starting point) is, however, beginning 
to show signs of strain as it faces immense debts, higher labour 
costs, and worsening relations with Western nations (upon 
whom it still depends for advanced technology). 
Leninism, even with Chinese characteristics, is unappeal-
ing – there is no global rush to buy the latest edition of Xi 
Jinping thought – pervasive surveillance creates both political 
and economic damage, and government-led central planning is 
inherently inefficient. These are China’s greatest challenges. At 
the same time, the US faces significant challenges of its own. 
These challenges are shared by America’s allies. An increasingly 
immense income disparity creates economic harm and political 
discontent. A feckless strategy that led to a squandering of re-
sources since the 2003 invasion of Iraq has left the US militarily 
weaker. Most importantly, a strong disinclination to spend on 
public goods like research, education and infrastructure, limit 
the potential of the American economy (and may be the source 
of China’s greatest advantage – there is no hesitation in Beijing 
to spend billions for long periods for public goods).   
This problem was unexpected, and Western nations built 
close economic ties with China in the last forty years on the 
expectation that China would be a friendly power. Companies 
took advantage of China’s cheap labour and growing market. 
These were profitable times. In turn, the Chinese used the 
threat of withholding market access, combined with an im-
mense commercial espionage campaign, to acquire Western 
technology. Until Xi Jinping, this was a trade issue of China not 
living up to its WTO commitments (without serious objection 
from the West). It is no longer a trade issue.
Competing Over Leadership: China vs the US 61
American Power in Decline
In contrast, the US basked too long in its Cold War “victo-
ry” and now faces significant problems. The core problems are 
the lack of strategic focus, deep social inequality that under-
cuts political stability, and under-investment in public goods. 
America spent over US$7 trillion on its misadventures in the 
Middle East. China spent similar sums on research, education, 
and industrial subsidies. The US cut government spending on 
basic research (except in healthcare), choking off what had been 
the most powerful source of American growth since the 1930s. 
Its political leaders have, since 1994, made cutting taxes their 
principle objective. Since it was politically unfeasible to directly 
cut social services, much of this fell on discretionary spending 
including research, infrastructure, and education.  
These cuts were justified on the grounds that the private sec-
tor would outperform government in providing public goods 
– this has proven not to be the case – and that security could 
be guaranteed by increased spending on defense rather than 
economic investment. This badly misinterpreted the changing 
nature of interstate conflict, where conventional military forces 
play a smaller role in producing global influence while strength 
in innovation and technology are more important.    
One fundamental problem for the US is a shift in social atti-
tudes about science and government (an aspect of what can be 
shown to be a larger decline in the legitimacy of existing insti-
tutions). A significant minority of Americans question both sci-
ence – the “anti-vaxxers” who refuse to vaccinate their children 
because of strange conspiracy theories – and the value of gov-
ernment funding for science. Among political elites, there has 
been a belief that private funding for research and market forces 
are enough to ensure progress1. This is bipartisan: Democrats 
look to Silicon Valley to provide growth, Republicans to Wall 
Street. This larger skepticism about government is reshaping 
1 Americans, Politics and Science Issues, Pew Research Center, 1 July 2015.
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American politics and creates a reluctance to use what Franklin 
Roosevelt called the “instruments of public power”. These 
trends put America at a competitive disadvantage.   
The relationship between government investment, private sec-
tor activity, and technological strength would benefit from a more 
complex and longer discussion, but the conclusions would re-
main the same. America built an innovation engine in the 1950s 
and turned it off in the 1990s. It is now gently coasting down, 
something that was tolerable when the US did not face challeng-
ers but that is no longer the case. The private research that was 
supposed to replace investment in public goods is focused on 
developing new products from existing technologies, not on the 
basic research that is the primary source of innovation2. 
Underinvestment in research hampers the US strategy for 
competing with China in technology. The core of that strate-
gy, which has only emerged in the last two years, is defensive, 
seeking to block technology transfers through regulations on 
investments or exports. But the US also seeks to “run faster” in 
developing new technologies in order to stay ahead of its com-
petitors. A purely defensive strategy that seeks to block tech-
nology transfer to China can at best only slow decline, but the 
call to run faster would be more persuasive had it not first been 
heard (but not implemented) in the late 1990s. The attraction 
of a defense based on regulation, however, is that it requires 
very little in the way of additional government spending and 
is consistent with an ideology that downplays government and 
relies on private sector activity.    
Can There Be a Divorce?
Disentangling the close commercial, financial and technology 
relationship between China and the US built over four decades 
2 See, for example, A. Arora, S. Belenzon, A. Patacconi, and J. Suh, The chang-
ing structure of  American innovation: Cautionary remarks for economic growth, National 
Bureau of  Economic Research, 28 March 2019.
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will not be easy, but we do not want to overlook a key point 
that complicates any separation. It is not just that the US and 
China share a supply chain for technology. It is that the sup-
ply chain has become global, with companies developing prod-
ucts and selling them with a range of international partners in 
Europe, Japan, Israel, India, Asia and North America. The end 
of the Cold War and its bifurcated trade system led to a profu-
sion of interconnections. The connection between the US and 
China is one of the most important, but it is not unique and if 
it were to be severed both would be damaged, but China would 
currently suffer more damage, given its dependence on Western 
technology.  
In thinking about how and where to restrict technology 
transfer, the central determining question for the US is whether 
it loses more than it gains from restriction. The answer to this 
question is not always easy, both because the consequences of 
restriction can be indirect and accompanied by collateral dam-
age to markets or innovation, and because they can change over 
time, with something that makes sense in the short term turn-
ing out to be damaging in the long-term, like a transfer that 
provides immediate economic benefit but has the long term 
effect of building a competitor. China uses five techniques to 
extract technology:
• Coercive business arrangements in China used to ex-
tract technology and build competitors.
• Acquisition of Western companies or financial arrange-
ments that provide access to technology.
• Purchases of advanced technologies. 
• Espionage, both human and cyber.
• The use of Chinese students and workers in the US as 
intelligence collectors.
If the US is serious about reducing the flow of technology to 
a hostile competitor, each of these methods must be addressed. 
All pose political difficulties because of commercial and aca-
demic pressures to continue lucrative arrangements with China 
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(and the Chinese count on this). In some cases, such as using 
regulatory powers to restrict foreign investment and technology 
exports, Congress has given agencies the authority to take action 
against China. In other cases, such as coercive business practices 
in China or the presence of Chinese students and workers in 
the US, existing authorities may be inadequate, and it remains 
uncertain if the trade talks now underway will change this. In 
all cases, an over-reliance on restrictions (such as limiting or 
even banning Chinese researchers) would be counterproductive 
and harmful to US interests.      
The dispute with China over its aggressive mercantilist poli-
cies and constant theft of intellectual property does not change 
this, and it is unlikely that any “trade deal” will solve this (and 
any deal is unlikely to be sustainable). However, the attention 
given to the risks of doing business with China have created 
market effects that slow China’s growth. Essentially, the cost 
of manufacturing in China has gone up. Companies are in-
creasingly reluctant to trust their IP to Chinese firms and while 
in some instances this means that manufacturing is returning 
to the US (which has one of the most advanced and efficient 
manufacturing bases in the world) it also means that firms are 
moving beyond China to other countries (like Vietnam) to gain 
the advantage of differential costs in labour.  
Technology and Competition
The complex pattern of commercial and research relationships 
challenges both nations. A straightforward correlation between 
technology and power can be challenged – having the best tech-
nology does not guarantee influence, power, or victory (as we 
have seen in the last 15 years, as the most technologically ad-
vanced military power confronted ragtag groups of insurgents 
in Afghanistan).  The diffusion of technology and access to the 
commercial services provided by new technologies (such as 
space remote sensing) create challenges in both the econom-
ic and military spheres. From a military perspective, having 
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indigenous capabilities to produce advanced technology may 
be becoming less important than the ability to exploit advanced 
technologies produced elsewhere.
Technological leadership does not automatically confer 
power. Political culture, national strategies, and business pol-
icies play a greater role, as do geographic size or population. 
Technology is one element among many in determining na-
tional power. The World Economic Forum once found Finland 
to be the most technologically advanced nation, and while this 
may translate into wealth for the Finns, it does not translate 
into power and influence.  Both China and the US have innate 
advantages and disadvantages, but over the long term, the US 
has had a more consistent record of success – the real question 
is whether it has abandoned the policies and social constructs 
that provided this success.     
America is hampered in this technological competition by its 
inability to finance public goods like research and its political 
discord. Such discord is suppressed in China, but other factors 
may hamper its continued technological improvement. First, 
greater government involvement in investment decisions po-
liticises the process and introduces inefficiencies. Market-based 
investments generally outperform central planning. China’s 
leaders know this and hope that an ability to mirror and copy 
Western market signals (perhaps using artificial intelligence 
tools to create “synthetic” market signals) will help compensate 
for this.    
Second, China’s innovation capabilities grew during a period 
of relative political openness. As this openness is reversed, it 
will be necessary to watch whether the ability to innovate will 
be damaged.  The correlation between innovation and openness 
is imprecise but intuitively appealing. China hopes to compen-
sate for any decline through increased espionage and invest-
ment (including, perhaps, performance-based incentives for 
successful Chinese companies).  
Finally, there is the international reaction to China’s policies. 
That the US regards China as a threat is one thing, but to have 
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the European Union declare it a “strategic competitor” and to 
have Japan restrict technology transfers suggest that Xi may 
have gone too far. The advanced technology that China relies 
on will become more difficult to obtain. This international re-
action was largely unexpected by the Chinese, a handicap creat-
ed by their self-imposed censorship of news that does not agree 
with the CCP’s narrative (which included assertions that China 
and its leadership are widely admired in countries around the 
world).  
There has been some debate in China on whether Xi Jinping 
had been premature in abandoning Deng’s policy of keeping a 
low profile internationally. In his defense, Xi was in part im-
pelled by domestic requirements to buttress the Party’s legiti-
macy and standing by demonstrating the centrality and success 
of its rule, but some Chinese commentators now urge a more 
restrained public posture.
Long-term trends favour China (ceteris paribus) but the im-
mediate picture does not speak of inevitable rise. Another way 
to compare China and the US is to look at changes in GDP, 
which are, after all, one of the primary motivations (along with 
military power) for technological innovation. This very coarse 
measure shows an unexpected pattern. Both economies have 
grown in the last five years, and China’s has grown at a faster 
rate (if we take its GDP figures at face value), but the “wealth 
gap” between China and the US has remained constant, with 
the US remaining US$7 trillion wealthier than China. Putting 
aside the inaccuracies of China’s official data (which routine-
ly overstate growth for political reasons), if the trends in both 
countries continue unchanged, China would have to increase 
its GDP at a faster rate to catch up to the US.
We can look at different sectors to assess the comparative 
strength of US and Chinese technological capabilities. One 
approach would be to look at new technologies that provide 
strategic capabilities – cyber, space and anti-satellite, preci-
sion-guided munitions, unmanned aerial or undersea systems, 
and hypersonic strike vehicles.  
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Tab. 3.1 - Comparison of US and Chinese 
Gross Domestic Product “Gap”
Year US GDP China GDP “Gap”
2017 $19.4 $12.2 $7.2
2016 $18.6 $11.2 $7.4
2015 $18.1 $11.1 $7.0
2014 $17.4 $10.4 $7.0
2013 $16.7 $9.6 $7.1
Source: World Bank
In some areas, particularly hypersonic strike systems, intel-
ligence reports suggest that China has made good progress. 
Alarmist intelligence reports even suggest that China has an 
advantage in this area. China’s cyber capabilities have also 
improved in the last few years. In other areas, such as space 
systems, unmanned vehicles or precision-guided munitions, 
China still lags in varying degrees.  
We can also ask how these new strategic military capabilities 
map to “emerging technologies”.  A 2017 Defense Department 
Report3 described Chinese efforts in Silicon Valley to acquire 
advanced technology through investments and partnerships. 
In response, Congress passed the Foreign Investment Risk 
Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA), accompanied by the 
Export Control Reform Act (ECRA).  President Trump signed 
both into law in August 2018. Additional restrictions were 
imposed by Defense authorisation legislation and Commerce 
Department regulatory actions, including the ability to “black-
list” specific Chinese companies. 
FIRRMA closed many of the gaps in technology transfer 
regulations that had been used by China to acquire American 
technology. FIRRMA expanded reviews of foreign investments 
by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
3 https://admin.govexec.com/media/diux_chinatechnologytransferstudy_
jan_2018_(1).pdf
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(CFIUS) to block risky acquisitions, and ECRA expanded tech-
nology controls on “emerging” and “foundational” technologies 
that are “essential to the national security of the United States”. 
As part of this expanded review function, the Department of 
Commerce published an initial list of emerging technologies. 
This preliminary list included fourteen general categories of 
technology: 
Biotechnology,
Artificial Intelligence, 
Position, Navigation, 
and Timing (PNT) 
technology,  
Microprocessor 
technology,
Advanced computing
Data analytics 
technology, 
Quantum information 
and sensing technology,  
Logistics technology,
Additive
manufacturing (e.g. 3D 
printing), Robotics
Brain-computer
interfaces, Hypersonics,
Advanced Materials, 
Advanced surveillance 
technologies
China leads in a few areas, lags in many others, and is a peer 
in several. China may have an advantage in hypersonic vehicles 
and the development of advanced materials, including “ener-
getics”. It lags in microprocessor technology and robotics. In 
other areas it has peer or near peer capabilities. The areas of 
competition that have attracted the most attention are artificial 
intelligence (AI), quantum computing, and 5G telecommuni-
cations. To this list it is necessary to add hypersonic as the most 
salient military technology. In each, there are strong Chinese 
competitors, but the US maintains an advantage.
Much of the Western discussion of AI exaggerates risk and 
leads to misapprehension over China’s progress in the field.  AI 
describes a set of powerful tools for automation that do not by 
themselves confer advantage. AI applications have been present 
(although perhaps not visible to the popular culture) and used by 
businesses for more than a decade. The elements of AI include 
widely available mathematical and statistical formulas that are en-
coded into algorithms and software, which do not in themselves 
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provide advantage. Advantage in AI comes from the ability to 
develop applications, and this depends on access to data.  
China does not have a clear data advantage. While Alibaba 
and other Chinese companies have access to the data of hun-
dreds of millions of Chinese users, they have less access in other 
markets (an outgrowth of widespread negative perceptions of 
China’s pervasive surveillance and the degree of control it ex-
ercises over its companies)4. In contrast, Facebook, Google and 
others service the rest of the world, and have access to twice 
as much data as Chinese companies. Facebook has 3.4 billion 
users, more than twice the population of China. 
Where China may have an advantage is in the limited scope 
of its privacy regulations. Restrictive or badly implemented pri-
vacy regulation in the West, along with efforts at data localisa-
tion in countries like India, could give China an advantage in 
the development of AI. China does have privacy regulations 
that are loosely modeled on Europe’s GDPR, but their effect is 
less limiting. In the US, national privacy regulation is still in a 
formative period.   
As an aside, the best example of the advantage conferred 
by weak Chinese regulation is in biotechnology, and China 
has made progress in developing its own biotech industry.  In 
China, companies enjoy streamlined and accelerated clinical 
trials, which lower costs5. Chinese investors are still attracted 
to the US biotech industry, however, because biotech is the one 
technology where research is well-funded by the US govern-
ment, an interesting indicator of the benefits of public spend-
ing and the damage caused by the US decision in the 1990s not 
to fund hard science at an equal level6.
China’s Huawei, a heavily subsidised private maker of tele-
communications equipment, is a world leader in 5G systems, 
4 Expanded use of  encryption and clashes with the US serves to insulate 
American companies from similar suspicions.
5 UBS Chief  Investment Office, “China’s Biotech Revolution”, 2 August 2018.
6 E. Emanuel, A. Gadsden, and S. Moore, “How the U.S. Surrendered to China 
on Scientific Research”, Wall Street Journal, 19 April 2019.
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second only to Eriksson (the other leading 5G companies are, 
in order of market share, Nokia, ZTE and Samsung). Huawei 
says it is the only company to offer all the elements of 5G net-
works from handsets to core telecom (Samsung also states that 
it can make a similar offer) but this leaves out the crucial point 
that Huawei is still dependent on US technology, particular-
ly from Intel, Qualcomm, and other advanced chip makers 
like Xilinx. Without these US components, Huawei could not 
make 5G systems and while China is spending heavily to be-
come independent (part of a larger national effort to develop 
an indigenous semiconductor industry), it will be some years 
before it can attain this7.
In some areas, such as quantum encryption, China has made 
significant strides. In other areas, such as making quantum 
computing chips, it lags behind.  The performance of China’s 
“Micius” quantum satellite is impressive, offering China a po-
tential avenue for more secure communications. But many 
Chinese-made information technologies can have serious vul-
nerabilities, as the recent UK review of Huawei technology 
found. China has brilliant researchers, and dynamic entrepre-
neurs, but its skilled workforce is still inadequate, it lacks the 
“know-how” for building advanced technology, and as its polit-
ical system grows more repressive, may discourage innovation.
China’s technology strategy resembles the older, pre-globali-
sation approach to policy based on a territorial concept of in-
dustrial policy. These policies worked best when China was a 
developing economy where resources are under-utilised, and 
markets are inefficient. Now, a government driven approach to 
investment faces real dangers for mis-investment or mis-allo-
cation.  Continued success in the global economy means that 
Beijing may need to cede even greater control over investment 
and operations to its private sector and to foreign companies 
if it is to keep China competitive. But China’s leaders have 
7 J. Lewis, “Learning the Superior Techniques of  the Barbarians: China’s Pursuit 
of  Semiconductor Independence”, Washington DC, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS), January 2019.
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increased the role of the party in investment and corporate 
management.  
Developing a new model for technological innovation that 
is not based on a reliance on national research and industries 
is a challenge for all nations. In this global context, the gov-
ernment-driven investment and incentive model that has suc-
ceeded for the US has reached the limits of its effectiveness, but 
there has been no serious effort to replace it (and pro-forma 
invocations of the benefits of public-private partnerships do not 
count). What form this new model should take is unclear, but 
one key characteristic may be the openness needed to benefit 
from a transnational research base.  In this, the US may have an 
advantage over the ethnically homogenous China.      
China’s technology strategies have global consequences – not 
just for the US but for all advanced economies and for impor-
tant emerging markets, such as India. The effects of China’s 
efforts are not just economic, but part of a larger reshaping of 
global influence and power where technological leadership plays 
a central role. The reorientation of American policy towards na-
tionalism and retrenchment gives China an advantage. But this 
race is not over, and it will be easier for the US to change course 
than it will be for China. The best outcome for both countries 
and the world would be a return to partnership on equal terms 
and on the basis of reciprocity in trade and business, but it may 
be impossible for the Communist Party to make such conces-
sions.  China’s rise is no longer peaceful, its economic policies 
harm the US and Europe and create global instability.isation 
We cannot go back to the Cold War, with two separate systems, 
one Western and one Communist, more or less sealed off from 
each other, but it is hard to see how we can return to a stable 
outcome before there is increased conflict.  

4.  A Green China. Impacts on Regional 
     and Global Energy Security
Fabio Indeo
In less than 10 years’ time, China has become a leader in renew-
able energy: currently it is the world’s largest producer, exporter 
and installer of solar panels, wind turbines and electric vehicles, 
and it accounted for over 45% of global investment in renewa-
ble energy in 20171.
The increasing use of solar, wind and hydroelectric power is 
progressively modifying the national energy mix, with the stra-
tegic goal of strengthening domestic energy security aimed at 
reducing dependence on coal (also cutting polluting emissions) 
as well as oil and natural gas imports. Moreover, China has in-
vested several billions to develop a modern clean energy tech-
nology, becoming the largest global manufacturer and exporter 
of solar panels, electric vehicles, batteries and wind turbines.
The aim of this chapter is to show how technological de-
velopment is a strategic tool for China in order to increase its 
domestic-endogenous energy production of clean electricity, 
consequently reducing its reliance on hydrocarbon imports. 
Furthermore, its role as the largest exporter of clean energy 
technologies could allow China to become the global leader 
of the expected energy transition from a fossil fuel system to 
a non-polluting energy system based on the use of renewable 
sources, as recommended by the Paris Climate Agreement.
1 A.Z. Amin, “Renewable Energy: Will China Be The Superpower?”, Newsweek, 
24 January 2019
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The realisation of global energy interconnection appears an 
ambitious geopolitical task to achieve, but the implementation 
of a regional energy cooperation with ASEAN countries based 
on the integration of clean electricity interconnection is cur-
rently underway: Chinese investments to develop renewable 
energy projects in Laos or Myanmar could help them enhance 
their energy security following a different and non-polluting 
paradigm of development.
China and Renewable Energy Sources: 
The History of an Ongoing Success
In recent years, China has significantly increased the use of so-
lar, wind and hydroelectric power in the domestic energy sce-
nario, strengthening and diversifying its energy security with 
the aim of reducing dependence on coal as well as oil and nat-
ural gas imports. 
According to the National Energy Administration (NEA), 
in 2018 China’s renewable energy installation capacity had 
reached 728 GW, an increase of 12% from a year earlier2. 
Hydro is the largest source (352 GW), followed by wind (184 
GW), photovoltaic (174 GW) and biomass (17,8 GW). While 
hydro was  developed a long time ago, particularly important 
are the growth of wind and photovoltaic (PV), which respec-
tively increased by 12.4% and 34% compared to the previous 
year3. Last year China was able to add another 20.59 GW of 
new wind power capacity to its grid, while new solar capaci-
ty reached 44.3GW after the first 100-megawatt solar power 
plant – located in in Dunhuang in the Northwestern province 
of Gansu – became operational4. 
2 National Development and Reform Commission People’s Republic of  China, 
National Energy Administration, official website. 
3 Ibid.
4 “China powers up renewable energy but some wind farms still struggle to plug 
into grid”, South China Morning Post, 28 January 2019
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In the hydropower sector, since 2012 China has been able 
to benefit from 22,500 megawatts of clean electricity gener-
ated by the Three Gorges Dam (the largest hydroelectric dam 
in the world), located in the middle of three gorges on the 
Yangtze River (the third longest in the world) in the Hubei 
Province of China5. 
At present renewable energy accounts for 38.3% of the coun-
try’s total installed power capacity6. According to NEA official 
statistics, power generation from renewable energy sources 
reached 1,870 TWh in 2018 – an increase of 170 TWh – and 
made up 26.7% of the country’s total, while hydro contributed 
1,200 TWh (up 3.2%), wind – 366 TWh (up 20%), PV – 
177.5 TWh (up 50%) and biomass – 90.6 TWh (up 14%)7. 
These record-breaking data are the results of the so-called 
“energy revolution” launched by President Xi Jinping in June 
2014, aimed at “curbing energy consumption by reducing coal 
share (a major source of pollution and climate-warming green-
house gas emissions) and increasing the shares of non-fossil fu-
els in China’s primary energy consumption”8, also enhancing 
energy efficiency measures.
A reduction in coal use is one of the main issues to address 
in order to achieve these energy goals: at present China is the 
world’s largest consumer of coal and consequently the world’s 
largest emitter of greenhouse gases9. Following China’s com-
5 “Three Gorges Dam”, Encyclopaedia Britannica.
6 “China powers up renewable energy but some wind farms still struggle to plug 
into grid”…, cit.
7 National Development and Reform Commission, (NDRC) People’s Republic 
of  China, National Energy Administration, official website; Liu Yuanyuan, “China’s 
renewable energy installed capacity grew 12 percent across all sources in 2018”, 
Renewable Energy World, 6 March 2019.
8 M. Vaid, “China’s energy revolution strategy”, The Asia Dialogue, 30 March 2018. 
9 A. Hafner, P. Janoska, C. Lee, Commentary: The importance of  real-world policy pack-
ages to drive energy transitions, International Energy Agency, July 9, 2018, https://
www.iea.org/newsroom/news/2018/july/commentary-the-importance-of-re-
al-world-policy-packages-to-drive-energy-transiti.html A. Hafner, P. Janoska, 
and C. Lee, The importance of  real-world policy packages to drive energy transitions, 
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mitment to supporting the Paris Agreement based on a global 
commitment to reduce polluting emissions, Beijing has seri-
ously adopted an increasing number of measures to reduce coal 
consumption and its share within the national energy mix (in 
which it accounted for 65% in 2015), paving the way to shift-
ing towards a cleaner energy system.
On 25 April 2017 the National Development and Reform 
Commission released the “Energy Revolution Strategy” (ERS), 
which sets out the key targets and strategies for China’s ener-
gy sector by 2030. The ERS clarifies that to achieve clean and 
low-carbon development, the share of non-fossil fuel in the 
energy mix should account for 15% in 2020 (12% in 2015) 
and 20% in 2030, while the proportion of coal consumption 
should fall below 58% (2020) and natural gas consumption 
should reach 10% (5.9% in 2015)10.
We can observe that China’s decision to largely develop re-
newable energy sources appears as a combination of the need to 
enhance and diversify its energy security condition, to handle 
environmental concerns and to ensure domestic stability.
Renewable energy has become a strategic priority for the 
Chinese government in order “to efficiently tackle problems of 
air and water pollution, and mitigate risks of socio-economic 
instability”11. As a matter of fact, environmental issues are a ma-
jor reason for mass protests, and domestic political stability and 
security represent the top priority for the Chinese authorities12.
Furthermore, achieving energy security is linked to reduc-
ing reliance on oil imports, which are mainly shipped through 
maritime routes (75% of total Chinese oil imports). This de-
pendence poses geopolitical and security concerns, because it 
is necessary to provide security along the sea lines of commu-
nication, even if the development of alternative land energy 
International Energy Agency, 9 July 2018.
10 M. Vaid (2018). M. Vaid (2018).
11 D. Chiu, The East Is Green: China’s Global Leadership in Renewable Energy, Center 
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 6 October 2017, p. 4.
12 Ibid. 
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routes along the Belt and Road Initiative partially remedies this 
vulnerability13.
In economic terms, solar, wind, hydro and biomass are 
domestic and endogenous energy productions that will push 
Beijing to reduce its dependence on imports. 
The Chinese authorities have released several strategic docu-
ments that show a concrete political engagement to move to-
wards a cleaner energy system based on a rising use of renewa-
ble sources. In the 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social 
Development of the People’s Republic of China (2016-2020) 
China defines its ambition: 
We will make a strong push to advance the energy revolution, 
giving impetus to a transformation in the way energy is pro-
duced and used, improving the energy supply mix, and elevating 
the efficiency of energy utilisation. We will build a modern ener-
gy system that is clean, low-carbon, safe, and efficient, and will 
safeguard the country’s energy security14.
The problem of reducing coal production and its share in the 
national energy mix represents a political challenge for the 
Chinese authorities, who are committed  to restricting the pro-
duction volume of coal in 2020 to 3.9 billion tons15.
The 13th Five Year Plan for the development of renewable en-
ergy outlines the main targets for energy development based on 
renewable sources during 2016-2020: according this document, 
the wind power integrated into grid should be more than 210 
million kilowatts by 2020, while the solar power integrated into 
the grid should be more than 110 million kilowatts, among 
13 F. Indeo, “China’s New Energy Sourcing: Disrupting and Competing or 
Improving Global Energy Security?”, in A. Amighini (ed.), China: Champion of  
(which) Globalization?, ISPI, Milan, 2018, pp. 124-125.
14 National Development and Reform Commission People’s Republic of  China, 
The 13th Five-Year Plan For Economic And Social Development Of  The People’s Republic 
Of  China, Chapter 30 Build a Modern Energy System, p. 84.
15 T. Yatsui, China’s Energy Policy and Related Issues towards 2020, Mitsui Global 
Strategic Studies Institute, Monthly Report, April 2017, p. 2.
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which 60 million kilowatts come from distributed photovoltaic, 
45 million from kilowatts photovoltaic power plant, 5 million 
kilowatts from thermal power generation and  conventional hy-
dropower scale will be 340 million kilowatts by 202016. 
Annual average increases in facility capacity are 21.2% in solar 
power and 9.9% in wind power where high growth is expected, 
though it is only 2.8% in water power17. By 2020, all renewable 
energy power generation capacity will be 680 million kilowatts, 
generating capacity 1.9 trillion kwh, accounting for 27% of all 
generating capacity. Lastly, the Five Year Plan for Electricity 
(2016-2020) aims to raise non-fossil fuel’s share of total elec-
tricity production from 35% to 39% by 2020, while one-fifth 
of national electricity consumption will be met by non-fossil 
fuel sources by 203018.
Furthermore, these programmatic documents also estab-
lish initiatives to resolve the existent hindrances that hamper a 
complete implementation of renewable energy sources, main-
ly to overcome the restrictions on transmission capacity that 
are curbing power generation. As a matter of fact, the Chinese 
authorities have observed that the potential of wind and so-
lar power generation is not fully utilised. For instance, in the 
northwest region with large-scale wind and solar capacity, elec-
tricity demand is lower and there are also constraints on the 
capacity of the power grid to provide electricity on the coast, 
which is the major region for electric power demand19.
Consequently, one of the main actions to deploy is to pro-
mote a balanced introduction of facilities among regions, allo-
cating increasing wind, solar and hydro power generation also 
to the east, the south and the north of the country. The efforts 
should be concentrated to strengthen power grid planning 
16 13th Five Year Plan for the development of  renewable energy , 10 December 2016, 
translated and published by Asian and Pacific Energy Forum.
17 T. Yatsui (2017), p. 3
18 D. Chiu (2017), p. 5. 
19 T. Yatsui (2017).
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and construction, also improving dispatch operations in order 
to promote a large-scale integration of renewable energy into 
the power system20. The further implementation of the large-
scale electricity transmission project called “West to East” is 
an infrastructure development priority. These expected three 
electricity-transmission corridors are conceived to transport 
clean electricity from the west – which has an energy surplus, 
especially from hydropower – to the east, where the main 
manufacturing and exporting regions (Guandong, Shanghai) 
are located, as well as  densely populated areas21. According 
to the 13th Five-Year Plan for Hydro Power Development 
hydropower transmission capacity should reach 100 million 
kilowatts by 202022.
Global Leadership 
in the Renewable Energy Sector
The overwhelming domestic success in the renewable ener-
gy sector allows China to harbour ambitions to become the 
world’s leader in green energy, even if current data and statistics 
already confirm this as Beijing’s global role. 
At present China is the world’s largest producer of solar (more 
than half of global solar power capacity) and wind energy, and 
the largest investor in renewable energy: in 2017 China decided 
to invest US$97 billion for renewables (which accounted for 
over 45% of global investments in renewable energy), while by 
2020 the investments in RE will rise to US$360 billion23.
20 13th Five Year Plan for the development of  renewable energy…, cit.
21 D.T. Gibson, Map: China’s West-East Electricity Transfer Project, Washington DC, 
Wilson Center, 19 February 2013.
22  13th Five-Year Plan for Hydro Power Development, 2016, translated and published 
by Asian and Pacific Energy Forum.
23 N. Shani, “Learning to Shift to Cleaner Energy from China”, ASEAN Energy, 
31 May 2018; Global Commission on the Geopolitics of  Energy Transformation, 
A New World. The Geopolitics of  Energy Transformation,  International Renewable 
Energy Agency (IRENA), 2019, p. 28. 
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According to the International Energy Agency, the Chinese 
public and private sectors will invest more than US$6 trillion in 
low-carbon power generation and other clean energy technolo-
gies by 204024. The installed solar power capacity is more than 
double that of the United States and Germany, while in the wind 
sector China has emerged as a frontrunner in both onshore and 
offshore growth: in 2018, for the first time, China installed more 
offshore capacity than any other market (1.8 gigawatts)25.
In addition to its investments, China has become the largest 
global manufacturer of these clean energy technologies: wind 
turbine components, crystalline silicon PV modules, LED 
packages, and lithium-ion battery cells26.
The governmental policy to concentrate huge and grow-
ing investments to develop modern technologies has led to 
high-quality production, reducing the global costs of these en-
ergy manufactures which are exported worldwide: for instance, 
the global prices of solar-panels were reduced approximately by 
80%, and similar results can be achieved also on battery prices, 
following massive investments of Chinese companies27. 
Last year, nine of the top ten biggest panel exporters were 
based in China, which together accounted for 66 gigawatts 
(GW) of the 91.5 GW of the solar panels commercialised in 
2018, meaning a market share of 70%28. For instance, Trina 
Solar is one of the largest solar panel manufacturers in the 
world, and has invested in increasing the efficiency of mul-
ti-crystalline-silicon solar cells29. 
24 A.M. Jaffe, “China’s Coming Challenge to the U.S. Petro-Economy”, Council 
of  Foreign Relations Blog Post, 22 February 2018.
25 A.M. Jaffe, “Green Giant, Renewable Energy and Chinese Power”, Foreign 
Affairs, 13 February 2018; Global Wind Energy Council, Global Wind Report 2018. 
26 A New World. The Geopolitics of  Energy Transformation…, cit., p. 40; A.Z. Amin (2019).
27 A.M. Jaffe, “Green Giant, Renewable Energy…, cit; Global Wind Energy 
Council (2018).
28 D. Kirton, “China’s Solar-Panel Makers Dominate Global Exports”, Caixin, 
24 January 2019.
29 “Trina Solar Panel Review”, Clean Energy Review, 9 April 2018.
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The Made in China 2025 initiative’s special focus on green 
development significantly expresses the profitable convergence 
of political and economic interests existing in the country, 
which will strongly support China’s ambition to become a glob-
al manufacturing and technological power in the industry of en-
ergy-saving and new-energy vehicles, through innovation, prod-
uct quality, efficiency, and integration-driven manufacturing30. 
The aim is to invest in research and development sectors with 
the goal of progressively reducing China’s dependence on foreign 
technology imports and to focus investments on the innovation 
of domestic companies, which should become more competi-
tive in the global market. One of the main tasks is to enhance 
domestic manufacturing processes to produce not only essential 
components but modern and competitive final products31. 
The production of electric vehicles is one of the strengths 
of the Chinese “energy revolution”, thanks to the concession 
of large state subsidies to the car industry and to promotion 
of their use. The new electric vehicles (NEV) include battery 
electric vehicles, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles and fuel-cell 
electric vehicles. The government set targets for sales of one 
million domestic NEVs by 2020 (70% of market share) and 
three million by 2025 (80% of market share)32. At present 
the Chinese car manufacturer BYD is the largest producer of 
electric vehicles in the world, while another six Chinese firms 
rank in the top 20. In 2018 more than one million electric cars 
were in use in China (almost double the number in the United 
States) and Beijing’s authorities plan to increase them to five 
million by 202033.
30 Institute for Security & Development Policy, Made in China 2025 
BACKGROUNDER, June 2018.
31 Ibid.; A. Amighini, What the MIC 2025 Means for the Chinese Economy, ISPI 
Commentary, 3 August 2018. 
32 G. Young,  “Made in Chiana 2025”: The development of  a new energy vehicle industry in 
China, Area Development and Policy, vol. 4, no. 1, 2019, pp. 39-59.
33 A.M. Jaffe, “Green Giant, Renewable Energy…, cit.
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The predominant position in the rare earth elements market 
is another factor that helps to explain why China will be able to 
lead the global success of  renewable energy sources. Rare earth 
elements are widely used in clean energy technologies, to pro-
duce solar panels and wind turbines: even if these elements are 
present in many countries, China currently holds a kind of mo-
nopoly over mining, producing and processing rare earth ele-
ments: consequently, producer countries usually send their rare 
earth elements to China, where they are processed and shipped 
back, making China the indisputable global supplier of these 
minerals, also considering that China and Russia together hold 
57% of global reserves34.
Moreover, other raw materials – mainly lithium, cobalt and 
indium – are also widely used in clean energy technologies. 
Lithium ion batteries are used to help manage the intermittency 
of solar and wind power and in electric vehicles35. China is one 
of the largest lithium producers and the global demand for this 
mineral will necessarily increase following the spread of electric 
vehicles as non-polluting cars with cost-competitive prices com-
pared to traditional automobiles. China and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo are respectively the world’s largest providers 
of indium and cobalt, which are also used in renewable energy 
technologies to produce solar panels and batteries36.
Considering that China holds large reserves of bauxite/alu-
minium, copper, iron and lead – which are the key minerals re-
quired for the production of solar and wind technology as well 
as for electric vehicles and energy storage – the Asian country 
can consolidate its predominant position in the production and 
export of renewable energy technologies37.
34 M. O’Sullivan, I. Overland, and D. Sandalow, The Geopolitics of  Renewable Energy, 
Working Paper, New York, Center on Global Energy Policy, July 2017, p. 12; U.S. 
Geological Survey, Rare Earths, Mineral Commodity Summaries, 2016.
35 M. O’Sullivan, I.Overland, and D. Sandalow(2017), p. 12.
36 Ibid.
37 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Green Conflict Minerals: The 
fuels of  conflict in the transition to a low-carbon economy.
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The widespread global consciousness of environmental 
problems and of the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
will lead many countries to undertake a shift in their energy 
strategy, focusing on the development of renewable sources. 
Achievement of the Paris Climate Agreement targets will have 
enormous implications for the role of renewables: according to 
the International Energy Agency, renewables will account for 
40-45% of the primary energy supply, while IRENA envisions 
a share of 65%38. 
Consequently, the demand for clean energy technology will 
increase in order to exploit the potential of renewables (solar, 
wind, biomass, geothermal) and China is well in position to be-
come a global exporter. Furthermore, Trump’s decision to with-
draw from the Paris Climate Agreement marks a disengagement 
of the United States from the green energy revolution, leaving 
room for China as a future renewable energy superpower. 
The results of this evolution will be a reshaped global ener-
gy scenario, within which China will act as global partner to 
promote green energy, supporting the efforts of other countries 
and granting them loans, offering clean energy products and 
goods at competitive prices, providing its technology, upgrad-
ing transport and energy infrastructures and also promoting a 
better integration of transport grids.
Regional Grids and Interconnections: 
China-ASEAN Energy Cooperation
Moreover, China will be able to enhance its global leadership in 
the renewable energy revolution also by promoting the creation 
of a cross-border energy super grid, aimed at exporting clean 
electricity or generally implementing cross-border electricity 
trading through the integration of regional interconnections.
38 International Energy Agency (IEA) and International Renewable Energy 
Agency (IRENA), Perspectives for the Energy Transition, 2017.
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This regional energy cooperation is one of the steps in the 
ambitious long-term goal – expressed by the State Grid, China’s 
largest state-owned company – to create the “Global Energy 
Interconnection”(GEI), a US$50 trillion worldwide wind and 
solar power grid which will link every continent with underwa-
ter transmission cables to provide green electricity around the 
world by 205039. 
China intends to implement the Global Energy 
Interconnection project within the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI) framework, which explicitly envisions “to foster green 
energy cooperation, improving regional energy security through 
the integration of the energy markets and encouraging the effi-
cient development and utilisation of clean energy. Furthermore, 
BRI promotes the creation of cross-border power transmission 
line construction, so upgrading the regional power grid”40.
In the regional framework, China and ASEAN coun-
tries (Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Brunei, Singapore, Malaysia and Myanmar) have 
started to work together in order to enhance energy and power 
cooperation, for the purpose of promoting efficient utilisation 
of energy and power within the ASEAN region, improving 
and expanding power grid operation and power accessibility41. 
China could play a role of reliable energy partner for ASEAN 
countries, supporting their efforts to boost domestic energy se-
curity through a growing use of clean electricity produced by 
renewable sources and reducing hydrocarbon imports and their 
use in the national energy mix.
ASEAN is now one of the most dynamic economic regions 
in the world: if ASEAN were a single country, it would be the 
world’s fifth largest economy, after the United States, China, 
Japan and Germany. According to IRENA and the ASEAN 
39 A New World. The Geopolitics of  Energy Transformation…, cit., p. 49; Global Energy 
Interconnection Development and Cooperation Organization (GEIDCO), official website.
40 National Energy Administration, Vision and Actions on Energy Cooperation in 
Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road.
41 ASEAN Center for Energy, ASEAN Power Cooperation Report, 2017.
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Center for Energy, “the expected population increase in the 
ASEAN region – from around 615 million in 2014 to 715 
million by 2025 – will lead to a 4% annual growth in ener-
gy demand until 2025, amounting to a rise of 50% over the 
2014 level, and electricity demand will double between 2014 
and 2025”42.
In this context, renewable energy appears to be the best op-
tion to increase the region’s energy security through greater di-
versification of the energy mix and by reducing demand for 
imported fossil fuels.
In 2015 ASEAN countries adopted the Plan of Action for 
Energy Cooperation (APAEC) 2016-2025, which includes the 
ambitious goal of achieving 23% renewable energy in total prima-
ry energy supply by 2025, which implies a two-and-a-half-fold in-
crease in the modern renewable energy share compared to 201443.
Renewable energy sources are abundant in Southeast Asia – 
hydro, geothermal, solar, wind – but most of them still remain 
untapped44. China’s task will be to support ASEAN countries 
in developing their renewable energy potential, helping to pro-
mote  an endogenous production of clean electricity and to ex-
pand the ASEAN Power Grid (APG) project, realising sub-re-
gional interconnections linked to China and thereby promoting 
cross-border clean electricity trading. The ASEAN Power Grid 
project has been conceived as an inclusive initiative, moving 
from a cross-border bilateral dimension, then expanding to a 
sub-regional basis and finally to a totally integrated regional 
system. This project will become the centrepiece of the regional 
power architecture, enhancing electricity trade across regional 
borders, which would provide benefits to meeting rising energy 
demand with clean and sustainable electricity supplies delivered 
through integrated infrastructures45.
42 International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), Abu Dhabi and ASEAN 
Centre for Energy (ACE), Renewable Energy Outlook for ASEAN: a REmap 
Analysis, 2016, p. 10.
43 ASEAN official website, ASEAN-EU Plan of  Action (2018-2022), 2017, p. 5.
44 International Energy Outlook, Southeast Asia Energy Outlook 2017, 2017.  
45 A. Gnanasagaran, “Building ASEAN’s power grid”, The Asean Post, 30 May 2018.
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Following the implementation of additional APG intercon-
nection projects, it is expected that power exchange and pur-
chase will almost triple from 3,489 MW in 2014 to 10,800 
MW in 2020, and further increase to 16,000 MW post-202046.
The APG project is an interesting one of regional cooper-
ation combining the different renewable energy sources that 
ASEAN countries are able to produce47. Laos is the leading 
ASEAN country in terms of hydro-power potential, with 39 
operative hydro-power plants and more than 90 that will be on 
stream by 202048. Furthermore, the Philippines and Indonesia 
are the second and third largest producers of geothermal energy 
in the world. 
China is actively investing in the development of renewable 
energy sources in Southeast Asia with hydroelectric projects in 
Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam (due to the untapped hydropower 
potential of the Greater Mekong sub-region) and Myanmar, and 
thermal power-generation projects in Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Singapore49. The China Southern Power Grid (CSG) is working 
with Laos to develop that country’s electricity infrastructures 
and it plans to create a regional power grid that will link China, 
Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Cambodia. Given the 
abundance of water energy resources, Laos is defined as the 
“ASEAN battery” and the future regional power hub: at present 
Laos already plays this role of clean-electricity regional suppli-
er, selling power to Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, 
China and Myanmar. China’s Electric Power Planning and 
Engineering Institute is helping Laos with its plans to develop 
as a regional power hub supplying electricity to Southeast Asia 
46 ASEAN official website (2017), p. 8.
47 F. Indeo, “ASEAN-EU energy cooperation: sharing best practices on renewable 
energy sources and the regional/global dimension”, Global Energy Interconnection 
(Geidco Journal), 2019 (forthcoming).
48 Mekong River Commission, “MRC ready to support review and update of  Lao 
hydropower strategy and plan”, 15 August 2018.
49 S. Songwanich, “China’s ambitious plans to power Southeast Asia”, Mekong 
Eye, 24 July 2018.
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and China’s Yunnan province, as one of the key segments of the 
planned world’s first global electricity network by 205050.
The implementation of the Laos-Thailand-China power in-
tegration project (as well as the Myanmar-Bangladesh-China 
power integration project) is conceived to deepen regional en-
ergy interconnectivity, providing secure supplies based on clean 
electricity.
Furthermore, Chinese companies have heavily invested to 
develop Myanmar’s hydropower sector, especially in the north 
of the country, which shares a border with China. The Shweli 
River Hydropower Station is one of the main examples of this 
fruitful regional energy cooperation: the installed capacity of 
the power station is 600MW and the designed annual generat-
ing capacity is 400MW51. Beijing’s State Grid Corporation of 
China has invested and launched a 230 kilovolt (KV) Nabar-
Shwebo-Ohntaw power transmission line and a substation 
project in Shwebo in Myanmar’s northwestern Sagain region52. 
Nevertheless, another big project – Myitsone Hydropower 
Dam project in Myanmar’s northern state of Kachin – appears 
frozen due to unsolved disputes between the two governments 
concerning unbalanced electricity distribution (90% to China 
and only 10% to Myanmar, even if free of charge) and for its 
high social and environmental costs53.
In Indonesia Chinese companies are interested in investing 
in hydroelectric projects in dams around the Kalimantan and 
Sulawesi regions. Since 2014 the Chinese manufacturer Yingli 
Green Energy Holding Company has made the solar panels 
for the biggest solar power plant in Malaysia at the time54. 
Moreover, CSG – together with other Chinese and Vietnamese 
50 Ibid.
51 ASEAN Power Cooperation Report…, cit., pp. 16, 18-19.
52 A. Gnanasagaran, “China’s energy ambitions in Southeast Asia”, The ASEAN 
Post, 17 August 2018. 
53 S. Ramachandran, “The Standoff  Over the Myitsone Dam Project in Myanmar: 
Advantage China”, China Brief, vol.  19, no. 8, 24 April 2019.
54 A. Gnanasagaran (2018).
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companies – has funded the Vinh Tan 1 thermal power plant 
located in Vietnam’s southern Binh Thuan province, together 
with China Power International Development and the Power 
Corporation of the Vietnam National Coal-Natural Industries 
Corporation55.
Definitely, ASEAN countries are also an interesting and 
promising market for China’s clean energy technology exports, 
such as photovoltaic cells and electric cars, considering the ex-
pected growth of the Southeast Asian population and the need 
to cut polluting emissions.
Conclusion
The large use of renewable energy sources in the domestic en-
ergy mix, the huge investments to develop a modern energy 
technology that is exported worldwide to meet the growing de-
mand for clean electricity, the geopolitical ambition to promote 
regional and global energy interconnections fuelled with clean 
electricity are allowing China to play the role of global leader in 
renewable energy sources. 
It is interesting to observe that this new global energy land-
scape based on a rising use of renewable sources could also 
change the common perception about Chinese ambitions on 
the international chessboard: as a matter of fact, China could 
progressively appear as a reliable energy superpower that aims 
to promote the worldwide use of renewable energy sources, of-
fering its clean energy technology to other countries and al-
lowing them to become energy producers. The possibility of 
exploiting their endogenous-renewable energy potential would 
mean reducing their dependence on oil and gas imports and 
coal use, meeting environmental targets as well as enhancing 
their energy security.
55 He Wei, “China-ASEAN to cooperate on new energy vehicles”, China Daily, 
11 July 2018. 
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However, the success of this Chinese strategy strongly de-
pends on the future position of the United States and other 
countries, which complain and are wary about Chinese geo-
political ambitions and the debt-trap deriving from the BRI-
labelled Chinese investments: trade disputes can emerge, with 
countries that try to preserve their national industries and pro-
duction through protectionist measures and tariffs, like Trump 
decision to levy 30% tariffs on solar cell and module imports to 
try to protect domestic manufacturers.
The implementation of regional or global electricity inter-
connections could ensure regular energy supplies for all in-
volved countries, promoting new frameworks of cooperation 
and relations. However, similarly to the case of transnational 
pipelines, the regional electricity interconnections could also be 
exposed to threats of interruption (transiting through a third 
country) and vulnerabilities that will become serious if a coun-
try is strongly dependent on clean energy imports.

5.  Case Study: China’s “Giant Leap” 
     Towards Fintech
 Paolo Giudici
China’s race to global technology leadership includes the devel-
opment of a strong financial technology (fintech) sector among 
its priorities.
Financial technology platforms lead to cost reduction, and 
to an improved user experience. However, these improvements 
may come at the price of inaccurate risk measurements, which 
can hamper a platform’s users and endanger the stability of a fi-
nancial system. In this chapter, we propose how to improve the 
credit risk accuracy of peer-to-peer platforms, to make them 
sustainable regardless of the country in which they are based. 
To achieve this goal, we propose augmenting traditional cred-
it-scoring methods with centrality measures derived from net-
work models of borrowers, estimated from their financial activ-
ity. We apply our proposal to fintech platforms in China and 
Italy characterised, respectively, by a large and a small incidence 
of fintech activities. Our empirical findings show that, in both 
cases, the inclusion of network centralities improves credit risk 
models and, therefore, makes fintech innovations sustainable.
In recent years, the emergence of financial technologies (fin-
techs) has redefined the roles of traditional intermediaries and 
has introduced many opportunities for consumers and inves-
tors. Here we focus on peer-to-peer (P2P) online lending plat-
forms, which allow private individuals to directly make small 
and unsecured loans to private borrowers, such as individuals 
and small/medium enterprises.
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The recent growth of peer-to-peer lending is due to sever-
al “push” factors. First, when compared to classic banks, P2P 
platforms have much lower intermediation costs. Second, the 
evolution of big data analytics and Artificial Intelligence en-
ables P2P platforms to provide banking services that can im-
prove personalisation and, therefore, user experience. A third 
push factor is the presence of favorable, or absent, regulation. 
An example of favorable regulation is the European Payment 
Service Directive (PSD2), which discloses bank clients’ account 
information to fintechs through application payment interfaces 
(API) that take consumer’s consent and ethics into account.
P2P lending business models vary in scope and structure: a 
comprehensive review is provided by Claessens et al. (2018). 
Here we specifically refer to the platforms that lend themselves 
to small and medium enterprises (SME), as in the paper by 
Giudici, Hadji-Misheva and Spelta (2019). A key point of in-
terest to assess the sustainability of P2P lenders is to evaluate 
the accuracy of the credit risk measurements they assign to the 
borrowers.
While both classic banks and P2P platforms rely on cred-
it-scoring models for the purpose of estimating the credit risk of 
their loans, the incentive for model accuracy may differ signif-
icantly. In a bank, the assessment of the credit risk of the loans 
is conducted by the financial institution itself, which, being the 
actual entity that assumes the risk, is interested in having the 
most accurate model possible. In a P2P lending platform, the 
credit risk of the loans is determined by the platform but the 
risk is fully borne by the lender (Serrano-Cinca et al., 2016). 
In other words, P2P lenders allow for direct matching between 
borrowers and lenders, without the loans being held on the in-
termediary’s balance sheet (Milne and Parboteeah, 2016).
From a different perspective, while in classic banking the fi-
nancial institution chooses its optimal trade-off between risks 
and returns, subject to regulatory constraints, in P2P lending 
the platform maximises its returns, without taking care of the 
risks that are borne by the lenders.
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Another factor that penalises the accuracy of P2P credit-scor-
ing models is that they often do not have access to the bor-
rowers’ data usually employed by banks, such as account trans-
action data, financial data and credit bureau data. For these 
reasons, the accuracy of credit risk estimates provided by P2P 
lenders may be poor. However, P2P platforms operate as social 
networks, which involve their users and, in particular, the bor-
rowers, in a continuous networking activity.  Data from such 
activity can be leveraged not only for commercial purposes, as 
is customarily done, but also to improve credit risk accuracy.
We believe that networking information can offset the afore-
mentioned disadvantages and can improve the credit risk meas-
urement accuracy of P2P lenders. From a regulatory viewpoint, 
this implies that P2P lenders should not be penalised with heavy 
compliance rules, or with the imposition of high capital buffers.
Classic banks have, over the years, segmented their reference 
markets into specific territorial areas and business activities, 
increasing the accuracy of their ratings, but also their concen-
tration risks. They automatically receive data that concern the 
transaction of each company with the bank and can easily ob-
tain further information about the financial situation and pay-
ment history of each company.
Differently, P2P platforms are based on a “universal” bank-
ing model, fully inclusive, without space and business type 
limitations, that benefits from diversification. P2P platforms 
automatically receive data from the participants in the plat-
forms that concern the transactions and/or relationships of 
each company not just with the platform but also with each 
other. Provided that enough companies populate the platform, 
the resulting networking data is richer than that of banks as 
it contains more information. In particular, it contains data 
about how companies and individuals interact with each other, 
in terms of payments, demand and supply chains, control and 
governance.
The latter information can be used for the purpose of cre-
ating a network model that can quantify how borrowers are 
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interconnected with each other. A model that can be employed 
to improve loan default predictions.
We aim to build a network model from the available plat-
form data. To achieve this goal, the issue is to quantify the in-
formation contained in networking data, often available from 
different perspectives: financial transactions between com-
panies, economic similarities, common holdings, presence in 
common demand or supply markets and so on, giving rise to a 
“multilayered” network.
The quantification of multilayered information requires the 
development of an appropriate statistical methodology. In this 
paper we follow the multilayer network approach suggested in 
Montagna and Kok (2015), Poledna et al. (2016), Aldesoro et 
al. (2016) and Avdjiev et al. (2018), for the analysis of multi-
layer interbank lending networks. In particular, we closely fol-
low Avdjiev et al. (2018) who represent the aggregate financial 
exposures of each country as a multilayer financial network, in 
which each network represents a type of borrower (financial 
sector, private sector, public sector).
In principle, this approach could be extended to peer-to-peer 
lending platforms for individuals and for SMEs, looking at the 
“physical” peer-to-peer financial transactions that occur be-
tween the borrowers in a platform, whether they are individuals 
or small/medium enterprises. This is the approach we will fol-
low in application to a Chinese platform for private individuals.
However, such data is not typically disclosed by P2P lenders 
so that, aiming for a generally reproducible analysis, we may 
need to look for alternative networking data. This is the ap-
proach we will follow in application to Italian platforms for 
SMEs.
Indeed, when physical transactions are not available we can 
look at statistically correlation networks that can be deduced 
from time series of publicly available information on SMEs, 
standardised according to common accounting standards. 
Correlation network models have proven to be effective, even 
in the interbank lending context, where transactional data is 
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usually available (see eg. Brunetti, 2015 and Giudici et al., 
2017).
Here we extend correlation networks to the P2P context, 
linking network models, that are often merely descriptive, 
with logistic regression models, thus providing a predictive 
framework.
The paper is organised as follows. The technical appendix 
explains the methodology we propose to achieve the stated re-
search goals. Section 2 presents the results obtained applying 
physical network models to a Chinese P2P personal lending 
platform. Section 3 presents the results obtained applying cor-
relation network models to Italian SMEs, potential custom-
ers of P2P platforms. We conclude with a final discussion, in 
Section 4.
Peer-to-Peer Personal Lending in China
Data
In this section we empirically verify whether P2P credit scor-
ing for personal loans can be improved using physical network 
models. The results we present are taken from the paper by 
Chen et al. (2019) to which we refer for further details.
The data used in the analysis is obtained from Renrendai, 
one of the largest peer-to-peer lending platforms in China. 
Founded in 2010, it now has over 1 million members located 
in more than 2,000 cities across the country. The transactions 
taking place at Renrendai are typical P2P lending transactions. 
Anybody with a Chinese identity card number can borrow or 
lend money on the website. On Renrendai, borrowers can post 
loan listings, adding information about loan usage, borrowing 
amount, interest rate, and duration. Renrendai only provides 
basic verification on borrowers’ national identification cards, 
credit reports, and locations. Once a loan listing is posted on-
line, lenders may place bids by stating the amount they want to 
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fund. With a minimum bid amount of RMB 50, a listing typ-
ically requires dozens of bids to become fully funded. A listing 
that achieves 100 percent funding status is a successful listing; 
otherwise, the borrower receives zero funding.
We consider all loan listings and the corresponding lending 
records created on Renrendai between January 1, 2011 and 
December 31, 2015.
For each loan listing, we have the corresponding lending re-
cords, including the lender’s ID, the interest rate, the amount, 
and the duration of the investment. While personal informa-
tion on the borrowers is disclosed, that about lenders is not. 
However, the ID number of all borrowers on Renrendai is 
available and, therefore, if a lender has posted a loan listing as 
a borrower on Renrendai, we can match it according to his/her 
ID and obtain personal information on the lender as well.
The considered data includes 44,481 loan listings from 
17,585 individual borrowers, of which 23,365 are successfully 
funded while the remaining 21,116 are not funded. Among all 
listings that are successfully funded, there are 3,618 defaults.
Empirical findings
We now present the application of networks models to describe 
the relationships between the borrowers in the Chinese P2P 
platform.
Figure 5.1 presents the evolution of the amount of total lend-
ing in the network, over the years. It shows that the amounts 
lent through the network have considerably grown over time. 
This with a peak around month 24, following by a subsequent 
decline.
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Fig. 5.1 - Evolution of the total lending in the network
Figure 5.2 shows the time evolution of the estimated networks, 
summarised in terms of the number of borrower nodes and of 
total links between such nodes. It also shows that the network 
has indeed increased the number of nodes, but has not cor-
respondingly increased the number of links between them. In 
other words, the network has become sparser.
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Fig. 5.2 - Evolution of the network complexity
Figure 5.3 shows a measure that is related to the “sparseness” 
of the network: the average path length. From Figure 5.3 note 
that the sparseness of the network has increased over time, due 
to the increase of the number of nodes, not balanced by a pro-
portional amount of transaction volumes.
The effects of networking on the probability of default, meas-
ured by (physical) network based logistic regression models, de-
scribed in the previous section, can be summarised as follows 
(for more details see Chen et al., 2019).
In terms of the obtained interest rate, all centrality param-
eters are negative and significant, indicating that the higher 
the centrality of a borrower, the lower the interest rate he/she 
obtains. This is probably because borrowers that are more con-
nected enjoy a good reputation and, therefore, can borrow at 
lower interest rates.
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In terms of funding success, the results indicate that the more 
central borrowers are in P2P lending, the easier it is to get loans. 
This again can be explained by the stronger network reputation 
of the most central nodes.
In terms of loan performance, borrowers with more connec-
tions are less likely to default. This implies that networking has 
a restrictive effect on borrowers’ moral hazard.
Finally, in terms of loan recovery rates, centrality parame-
ters are not significant. This is in line with the intuition that 
recovery is a process that may be affected by administrative and 
structural characteristics that do not relate so much to peer-to-
peer networking.
Fig. 5.3 - Evolution of the avarage path length
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To summarise, all results from the different logistic regressions 
indicate that the greater the centrality, the better the borrowers’ 
performances, with a lower interest rate, a higher rate of suc-
cess, and a lower default rate.
Peer-to-Peer SME Lending in Italy
Data
In this section we empirically verify whether P2P credit scor-
ing for SME loans can be improved using correlation network 
models. The results we present are taken from the paper by 
Giudici et al. (2019) to which we refer for further details.
Data is obtained from mode finance, a European Credit 
Assessment Institution (ECAI) that supplies credit scorings 
to P2P platforms specialised in business lending. Specifically, 
the analysis relies on data about 727 borrowing SMEs, mostly 
based in Italy covering the period [2007-2015]. The proportion 
of observed defaults in the sample is equal to 23%, a large pro-
portion, in line with the observed impact of the recent financial 
crisis in Southern European countries.
The available data include the status of the companies, clas-
sified as [1 = Defaulted] and [0 = Active] as well as information 
on their most important financial characteristics. This informa-
tion can be used to estimate a credit-scoring model aimed at 
predicting default status on the basis of the observed values of 
a set collection of financial variables, derived as ratios from the 
yearly balance sheet of each company. As financial indicators 
we can choose, without loss of generality, those most frequently 
reported in the literature.
Empirical findings
We now present the application of correlation networks to de-
scribe and summarise the relationships between the borrowing 
SME in the P2P platform.
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As previously discussed, our proposed correlation network 
models aim to infer the networking properties among the bor-
rowers in a P2P platform from the time comovement among 
the values that a given set of random variables take, when ap-
plied to their yearly financial statements.
We propose to choose, as base variables, three well-known 
financial ratios, among those in Table 5.1: the (1) activity ratio, 
expressed as the ratio between sales and total assets; (2) the sol-
vency ratio, expressed as the ratio between net income and total 
debt and (3) the return on equity ratio. The choice of these vari-
ables reflects the need to consider company similarity according 
to the most important aspects: business sustainability, financial 
sustainability and operational performance.
Following this choice of variables, three time series of data 
can be extracted, for each of the 727 considered companies. 
Consequently, three 727 x 727 correlation matrices (weights) 
are obtained. Instead of using a fully connected correlation 
network, with all edges present, which would be as many as 
(727×726)/2 = 263901, we consider a more parsimonious 
network, in which an edge between two companies is present 
when the corresponding test in (2) is significant at a level of α 
= 0.01. The application of the test gives rise to three 727 x 727 
adjacency matrices, in which an edge is either present or absent, 
depending on whether the corresponding correlation is signifi-
cant or not significant.
Figure 5.4 shows the network obtained using the activity in-
dicator to calculate correlations. In the figure, nodes are colored 
based on their status, with red indicating companies that have 
defaulted in the considered period, and green still active com-
panies. The nodes are not equal but, rather, have a size propor-
tional to their degree of centrality, with bigger nodes indicating 
more connected ones. Edges are instead colored according to 
the sign of the found correlation: green for a positive correla-
tion, and red for a negative correlation.
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Fig. 5.4 - Correlation network based on the activity 
indicator. Number of nodes= 386
Figure 5.5 shows the network obtained using the solvency indi-
cator to calculate correlations. The figure is based on the same 
assumptions used for the activity ratio, in terms of the signifi-
cance level, and about the coloring and dimensioning of nodes 
and edges.
Figure 5.5 indicates that the central companies are less than 
before (288) and that most of them are good companies.
Finally, we consider the network model that emerges using 
the correlations between companies calculated in terms of the 
return on equity indicator over the considered period. Figure 
5.6 presents the corresponding representation, maintaining the 
same assumptions as before.
Looking at Figure 5.6, the correlation network obtained 
using the return on equity indicator shows a low number of 
central nodes (226) and a limited presence of defaulted com-
panies. These findings point towards the idiosyncratic nature of 
the return on equity indicator, which appears company specific, 
rather than driven by a systematic driver, consistently with the 
economic intuition.
We now present the application of correlation networks 
to describe the relationships between the borrowers in a P2P 
platform.
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Fig. 5.5 - Correlation network based on the solvency 
indicator. Number of nodes= 288
Fig. 5.6 - Correlation network based on the return on equity 
ratio. Number of nodes= 226
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We now estimate a credit-scoring model. First we estimate a 
baseline logistic regression model as a departure point, before 
moving towards the application of our proposal, a correlation 
network based logistic regression model.
Table 5.1 summarises the results from the application of a 
logistic regression model to the available data.
Tab. 5.1 - The estimated baseline regression model
Estimate P Value Significance
Intercept 18.040 0.000 ***
Activity ratio -3.897 0.000 ***
Cash over total assets -0.636 0.772
Coverage 0.000 0.672
Current ratio 0.100 0.557
Return on assets -0.072 0.277
Return on equity -0.023 0.206
Solvency ratio 0.004 0.774
Total assets -2.630 0.000 ***
Area Under the Curve 0.622
From Table 5.1 note that two variables are found significant 
and those are: the activity ratio and the total assets. The sig-
nificance of the former is in line with the observation that, in 
the considered period, the companies in southern Europe, to 
which the companies in our sample belong, have suffered from 
a considerable decrease in GDP. However, companies have re-
acted differently to recession: some, and especially those more 
oriented toward the internal markets, have shrunk their sales; 
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others, and especially those more export-oriented, have main-
tained or increased their sales, thus explaining the significance 
of the activity ratio: companies that are better able to use their 
assets to generate sales are less likely to default.
From Table 5.1 note that the estimated coefficient for the to-
tal asset variable also has the expected negative sign, suggesting 
that larger companies are typically less likely to default, com-
pared to companies with smaller assets.
To improve model accuracy, we employ correlation networks. 
To this aim, we augment the available data matrix with the de-
gree of centrality measures, calculated for each node on the ba-
sis of the correlation network models derived in the previous 
section. More specifically, we have added to the baseline logistic 
regression model the three variables corresponding to the de-
gree of centrality of each company in the Activity, Solvency and 
Return on Equity ratio. To avoid double counting, we have re-
moved the original three variables from the logistic regression. 
Table 5.2 reports the results from the network based logistic 
regression model.
Table 5.2 shows that the degree of centrality based on the 
activity ratio is significant, whereas those based on solvency and 
ROE are not. The sign of the significant centrality is positive. 
This means that the higher the centrality degree of a particular 
company, the higher the probability that it would be connect-
ed with a defaulted company, and this may negatively impact 
its overall probability of default. On the other hand, note that 
the negative sign of the Total Assets variable is confirmed, al-
though with a lower magnitude. The variable Return on Assets 
becomes significant, with the expected sign (higher values lead-
ing to a lower probability of default).
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Tab. 5.2 - The estimated network based regression model, 
with all type centralities
Estimate P Value Significance
Intercept -0.241 0.814
Cash over total assets 0.600 0.612
Coverage 0.001 0.672
Current ratio 0.051 0.632
Return on assets -0.143 0.001 ***
Total assets -0.285 0.062 *
Degree centrality 
(Activity) 0.011 0.008 ***
Degree centrality (ROE) -0.038 0.412
Degree centrality 
(Solvency) -0.017 0.355
Area Under the Curve 0.8357143
In terms of predictive accuracy, the model in Table 5.2 leads to 
an AUROC of 0.835, much higher than the AUROC in Table 
5.1, equal to 0.622. This suggests that the inclusion of network 
centrality parameters, besides improving explainability, also im-
proves predictive accuracy.
Conclusion
In the paper we have shown that the business model on which 
peer-to-peer lending platforms are based (networking) can be 
exploited also from a risk management viewpoint.
This applies especially to large peer-to-peer fintechs, like 
those present in China, but can apply also to smaller European 
fintechs, as the Italian case has shown.
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Specifically, we have shown that, for both personal and SME 
lending, credit risk measurement can be improved, both de-
scriptively and predictively, using network-based information.
This allows fintech activity to be more sustainable, not only 
from the business’ side, but also from the users’ perspective.
We believe that the main beneficiaries of our results may be 
regulators and supervisors, aimed at preserving financial stabil-
ity, as well as investors of P2P platforms, who should be pro-
tected against the negative sides of fintech innovations (higher 
risks) while keeping their positive sides (lower costs and better 
user experience). For a general discussion of this point see also 
Giudici (2018). Based on the obtained results, we also believe 
that China’s leadership in financial technology, and particularly 
in peer-to-peer lending, can be beneficial for the world econo-
my if fintech risk models increase their accuracy as shown here.
Technical Appendix
The most popular statistical model to estimate the probability 
of a borrower’s default is the logistic regression. In the con-
text of P2P lending, logistic regression has been used by Barrios 
et al. (2013), Emekter et al. (2015) and Serrano-Cinca et al. 
(2016). These authors classify P2P borrowers in two groups, 
characterised by a different history of repayments of the loans 
that were funded through the platform: 0=active (all loans have 
been paid on time); 1=default (at least one loan has not been 
paid on time).
A logistic regression model estimates the probability that a 
borrower defaults, using data on a set of borrower-specific var-
iables. More formally:
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where, for each borrower i = (1, . . . , I): pi  is the probability 
of default; xi = (xi1, . . . , xij , . . . , xiJ) is a vector of borrower-spe-
cific explanatory variables; the intercept parameter α, and the 
regression coefficients βj , for j = 1, . . . , J , are unknown, and 
need to be estimated from the available data.
From the previous expression the probability of default of 
each borrower can be obtained as:
 
the credit score of i, whose default status will be predicted to be 
1 or 0 depending on whether pi exceeds or not a set threshold 
θ. Common choices for the threshold are θ = .5 or θ = d/I, with 
d the observed number of defaults.
The previous model, once estimated on a training sample, 
can be used to predict the probability of default on a new loan, 
so that lenders can decide whether to invest in it or not. This 
decision crucially depends on the accuracy of the prediction, 
which, in turn, depends on the validity of the employed model. 
As discussed in the introduction, peer-to-peer lending platforms 
may underestimate the probability of default on a loan, because 
of a high set threshold or because of a lack of explanatory var-
iables data. While the choice of a threshold remains a subjec-
tive decision, the improvement of the explanatory variables can 
be achieved exploiting borrowers’ networking data. We believe 
that incorporating network information into a credit-scoring 
model could improve default predictive accuracy.  This requires 
building an appropriate network analysis model.
Network analysis models have become increasingly recog-
nised as a powerful methodology for investigating and mode-
ling interactions between economic agents (Minoiu and Reyes, 
2010). In particular, correlation network models, that rely on 
correlations between the units of analysis (borrowers, in our 
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context), according to a given set of statistical variables, have 
been proposed by Giudici, Spelta and Sarlin (2017), in the 
context of interbank lending. The authors compare correlation 
networks with “physical” networks, based on actual transac-
tions, and show that they can achieve comparable predictive 
performances.
Mathematically, correlation network models are related to 
graphical models. A graphical model can be defined by a graph 
G = (V, W) where V is a set of vertices (nodes) and W = V × V  is 
a set of weights (links) between all the vertices.
In a graphical Markov model (see e.g. Lauritzen, 1996) the 
weight set specialises to an edge set E, that describes whether 
any pair of vertices (i, j) is connected (i, j) ∈ E or not (i, j) /∈ E. 
A graphical Markov model can be fully specified by an adjacen-
cy matrix, A. The adjacency matrix A of a vertex set V is the I 
× I matrix whose entries are aij = 1 if (i.j) ∈ E, and 0 otherwise.
From a statistical viewpoint, each vertex v ∈ V in a graphical 
Markov model can be associated with a random variable Xv. 
When the vector of random variables (Xv, v ∈ V ) follows a mul-
tivariate Gaussian distribution, the model becomes a graphical 
Gaussian model, characterised by a correlation matrix R which 
can be used to derive the adjacency matrix. This because the 
following equivalence holds:
(i, j) ∉ E  ⇐⇒ (R−1)ij = 0
which states that a missing edge between vertex i and vertex 
j in the graph is equivalent to the partial correlation between 
variables Xi and Xj being equal to zero.
Building on the previous equivalence, a graphical Gaussian 
model is able to learn from the data the structure of a graph 
(the adjacency matrix) and, therefore, the dependence structure 
between the associated random variables. In particular, an edge 
can be retained in the model if the corresponding partial corre-
lation is significantly different from zero.
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In a network analysis model (see e.g. Barabasi, 2016), the set 
W is a set of weights, which usually connect each variable with 
all others. In other words, the graph is fully connected.
From a statistical viewpoint, each vertex v ∈ V in a network 
analysis model is associated with a statistical unit, and each 
weight describes an observed relationship between a pair of 
units, such as a quantity of goods or a financial amount. While 
the adjacency matrix in a graphical Markov model is symmet-
ric, the weight matrix does not need to be so. For instance, in 
interbank lending, which is one of the main applications of net-
work analysis to the financial domain, the weights are financial 
transactions, with wij indicating how much i lends to j and wji 
indicating how much j lends to i. The aim of a network analysis 
model is not to learn from the data the structure of a graph but, 
rather, to summarise a complex structure, described by a graph, 
in terms of summary measures, or topological properties.
A correlation network model (see e.g. Mantegna, 1999; 
Brunetti, 2017; Giudici et al., 2017) is a network analysis mod-
el for which the weights are not directly observed, but are cal-
culated as pairwise correlations between the values of a given 
random variable Xv, observed at different time instances (1, . . ., 
N ), for each pair of statistical units.
Note that correlation network models are similar to graphi-
cal Markov models, as they are based on statistical relationships 
between variables. However, differently from graphical Markov 
models, (and similarly to network analysis models) they relate 
units, rather than variables, and they are based on correlations 
rather than on partial correlations.
Note also that correlation networks are different from finan-
cial networks, the network analysis models typically consid-
ered in the financial literature (see e.g. Battiston et al., 2012). 
Financial networks are based on data that describe the actual 
financial flows between each pair of borrowers, in a given time 
period. If this information is available we could use them as 
weights, directly. However, this is an approach that we cannot 
follow when the transactions between borrowers are not available 
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or, even when they are, when they lead to a sparse weight ma-
trix. In addition, Giudici et al. (2017) showed, in the context of 
international banking, that, even when available and not sparse, 
financial networks can be matched, or even improved, in terms 
of predictive performance, by correlation networks.
In the peer-to-peer lending context, each vertex of a corre-
lation network can correspond to a borrower company; while 
each edge can represent the correlation between the vector of 
values that a statistical variable takes, a long time, for two dif-
ferent companies.
To exemplify, we can associate with each borrower i = 1, ..., 
I a vector Xi = (Xi, t = 1 . . . , N ) that contains the values of a 
random variable, such as the total assets of a company, in N 
distinct time periods. A weight wij between any two vertices can 
then be defined by the correlation between the time series Xi 
and Xj, as follows:
where xi = (xi , . . . , xi N) and x
j = (xj , . . . , xj N) are the two 
series of observed values of the random variable, respectively for 
units i and j, at times t = 1, . . . , N .
According to the above definition, the weight between any 
two vertices is a correlation coefficient, with the corresponding 
properties. In particular, a high positive value of wij means that 
the two companies are “similar”: they move along time in the 
same direction. Conversely, a high negative value means that 
they move in opposite directions.
We now extend correlation network models. In analogy with 
graphical Markov models we replace the weight matrix W with 
an adjacency matrix E, and associate the absence of an edge in 
E with a zero correlation between the corresponding pair of 
companies. More formally, we take G = (V, E), and let
t
1 1
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Then, similarly as in graphical Markov models, an edge can 
be retained in the model if the corresponding correlation is sig-
nificantly different from zero. If we assume that the underly-
ing random variable is Gaussian, a reasonable assumption in 
finance, we can test whether the correlation is different from 
zero employing the t-test given by:
which can be shown to be distributed as a student’s distribu-
tion with N − 2 degrees of freedom.
Note that our proposed correlation network model is based 
on a random variable, X, that takes different values for differ-
ent borrowers, and in different time periods. In practice, when 
data on borrower companies are available, for example from 
their annually reported balance sheet, we may observe many of 
such variables, and, therefore, we can construct more than one 
correlation network model. This requires the construction of a 
multilayer correlation network model.
A multilayer correlation network can be mapped into a ten-
sor X ∈ RI×I×K where I represents the number of borrowers and 
K the number of considered random variables.  
Each element of the tensor, xk represents the correlation be-
tween borrower i and borrower j, using variable k, as in formula 
(1). The tensor is composed by K weight matrices X ∈RI×I, each 
of which represents a correlation network between borrower 
companies, using one variable.
We remark that each weight matrix can be transformed into 
an adjacency matrix, according to the testing procedure in (2).
ij
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A drawback of the proposed multilayer correlation networks 
is that it gives rise to K different correlation networks, which, 
particularly when the measurements are highly correlated with 
each other, may be redundant. One way to address this prob-
lem is to embed all the information contained in the different 
layers into a linear model, along with other exogeneous explan-
atory variables, which is the approach followed in this paper.
It is evident that a multilayer network is a complex object, 
which requires, to be utilised, some form of summarisation. 
Centrality measures are useful network summaries that can be 
extended to the multilayer context, as shown in Avdjiev et al. 
(2018).
For simplicity, and ease of interpretation, here we consider, 
for each measurement variable k, the degree of centrality, which 
in our correlation network context indicates the total number 
of nodes to which a node is significantly correlated. Or, equiv-
alently, the number of edges connected to a particular node.
For a correlation network G = (V, E) described by the binary 
edge set E, the degree centrality of a node x ∈ V is defined by:dx = ∑y≠x exy 
From a statistical viewpoint, the degree of centrality is the 
simplest and most interpretable centrality measure. In addition, 
it is quite robust to changes in the topology of a network: for 
instance, adding or removing one node has a very limited effect, 
in a large network, as the degree of each node can go up or 
down at most by one unit.
From an economic viewpoint, the existence of a positive sig-
nificant correlation between two borrowers can indicate that 
they have the same buyers, or that they operate in complemen-
tary markets. It seems intuitive that, if an active company is 
positively correlated with several defaulted companies, its credit 
scoring should be negatively affected. Conversely, the existence 
of a negative significant correlation between two borrowers can 
indicate that they compete in terms of buyers and/or markets. 
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It seems intuitive that, if an active company is negatively corre-
lated with several defaulted companies, its credit scoring should 
be positively affected.
The final part of our model specification is to embed the 
obtained centrality measures, one for each measurement, into a 
predictive model. We propose to incorporate network measures 
in a linear regression model, to the logistic regression context, 
and taking the multilayer dimension into account through an 
additive linear component. More formally, our proposed net-
work-based scoring model takes the following form:
where pi is the probability of default, for borrower i; xi = (xi1, 
. . . , xij , . . . , xiJ) is a vector of borrower-specific explanatory 
variables, gik is the degree of centrality measure for borrower i, 
under the measurement k; the intercept parameter α and the 
regression coefficients βj and γk, for j = 1, . . . , J and k = 1, . . . 
, K are to be estimated from the available data.
It follows that the probability of default can be obtained as
We expect that by “augmenting” a logistic regression cred-
it-scoring model, by means of the proposed centrality measures, 
its predictive performance will improve.
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